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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Fire Insurance Exchange has appealed an Order entered by
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on March 25, 1992 denying Fire
Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur.

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did Judge Frederick abuse his discretion in denying Fire
Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur? This Court reverses
the trial court only if there is no reasonable basis for the
decision.

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805

(Utah 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This appeal involves the propriety of the punitive damage

award entered against Fire Insurance as a result of the intentional
fraud it perpetrated on the Crookstons.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings.
This is the second appeal taken by Fire Insurance in this

case.

In the first appeal, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange.

817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), this Court affirmed the jury's finding
that Fire Insurance had committed fraud, upheld the compensatory
award

and

determined

that Fire Insurance had

acted with the

requisite mental state to justify an award of punitive damages.
However, the Court vacated

the trial court's denial
1

of Fire

Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur pertaining to the $4
million punitive award and remanded the motion to the trial court
for further review.
On remand, the parties briefed the motion in light of the
Crookston opinion, and Judge Frederick heard oral argument on
January 31, 1992. After having reviewed the parties' memoranda, the
Crookston opinion, the file materials, the transcript and his own
notes, Judge Frederick issued a Memorandum Decision on February 10,
1992 again denying Fire Insurance's motion.
Exhibit A.)

Judge Frederick subsequently entered his formal order

on March 25, 1992.
C.

(Copy attached as

(Copy attached as Exhibit B.)

Statement of Facts.
This case involves the failure of Fire Insurance Exchange,

a member of the Farmers Insurance Group, to timely and properly
adjust and settle a casualty loss to the Crookstons' home. Through
a series of misrepresentations and concealments, Fire Insurance
perpetrated a fraud on the Crookstons and on Rocky Mountain State
Bank

("the

Bank") , holder

of

a first deed

of

trust

on the

Crookstons' home and loss payee under the Fire Insurance policy. By
means of a fraudulent and inadequate settlement with the Bank, Fire
Insurance obtained a release and satisfaction of the Bank's claim on
the policy.

The Bank then proceeded to foreclosure.

As a result,

the Crookstons lost their home and were forced into bankruptcy. The
Crookstons

filed

suit against Fire Insurance, resulting

judgment in June, 1987.

2

in a

It has now been over a year since the first appeal was
completed. Memories fade over time. Since the issues on appeal are
fact intensive, it is important to review the facts in detail.
1.

Mr. and Mrs. Crookston were married in 1973.

Mr.

Crookston continually worked two to three jobs and saved for many
years until 1978, when the Crookstons paid cash for a vacant lot in
Bountiful, Utah.

(R. 2000-1) They continued to work and save their

money in anticipation of building their home on the unencumbered
lot.
2.

In December 1980, the Crookstons obtained a con-

struction loan from the Bank in the amount of $60,000 and in the
early part of 1981, began construction.

(R. 2006) During the course

of construction, the Crookstons personally paid approximately $5,000
toward construction costs and paid the Bank $12,000 to reduce the
construction loan.

(R. 2009; Ex's. 2, 5)

The Crookstons also

performed various services such as painting and finish work in order
to keep costs down.

(R. 2019-20, 2160)

On December 2, 1981, the

roof of the Crookstons' home collapsed, causing extensive damage.
3.

Kyle Brewster, the contractor who was building the

Crookstons' home, had approximately 40 years of contracting and
estimating experience. (R. 2150)

He testified that just prior to

the time of the collapse, the home was approximately two-thirds
completed and had the collapse not occurred, the home could have
been completed within budget during the next four to five weeks. (R.
2159-60, 2181) Besides the structure, scaffolding, other e- lipment

3

and unused building materials were also destroyed in the collapse.
(R. 2161-62, 2114)
4.

The Crookstons gave prompt notice to their insurer,

Fire Insurance, who assigned Denton Moser to investigate and adjust
the loss.

Other than taking pictures, Moser did very little to

determine the scope of the damage and evaluate the loss.
12)

(Ex. 11,

Fire Insurance did not contest coverage and admitted that the

cause of the collapse was irrelevant to the Crookstons' claim.

(R.

1889-90, 2236) In mid-December, 1981, Fire Insurance retained Kent
Rich, an engineer, to determine the cause of the collapse for
purposes of protecting and enabling Fire Insurance to pursue a
subrogation claim.

Fire Insurance did not request Mr. Rich to

ascertain the scope of the damage or evaluate the loss for adjusting
purposes.

(R. 2655-57, 1926; Ex. 41, p. 3-4)
5.

Within a few weeks after the collapse, the Crookstons

retained attorney Ralph Klemm because they were concerned that Fire
Insurance was not doing anything to adjust the loss. In their first
communication, Moser asked Klemm to assist him in obtaining a bid to
have the home repaired.

(R. 1686-87)

Mr. Klemm obtained an esti-

mate from Rex Stallings, an experienced contractor of 36 years. (R.
2097)

The Crookstons and Moser also sought an estimate from

Brewster.

(R. 2403-4)
6.

By the end of March, 1982, Moser had the bids of two

contractors: (1) Brewster in the amount of $50,951, and (2) Rex
Stallings in the amount of $49,600. (Ex. 38, p. 2; Ex. 40; R. 169394) Based upon these bids, Moser submitted an internal request for
4

$50,000 settlement authority to the Pocatello regional office.
1977).

On April

15, the regional office extended

authority in the amount of $49,443.00. (Ex. 13, p.2)

(R.

settlement

In May, Moser

obtained a bid from Jimmy Jones, an architect, in the amount of
$74,000 (Ex. 11, p. 101), but ignored it without inquiry.

(Ex. 11,

p.101; R. 1992)
7.

Rather than offering anything to settle the claim,

Fire Insurance requested Rich, the engineer, to perform an analysis
of the observable structural damage.

(R. 2654-56, 2663) On May 25,

Rich prepared a report outlining some of the structural damage that
had to be addressed.

(Ex. 41, p.l) Fire Insurance never requested

Mr. Rich to evaluate all of the damage, nor did it ever inform Rich
that his report would be the basis for a bid to reconstruct the
house.

(R. 2656) Rich testified that, "The approach that I took in

making that investigation was not such that my report could be used
as a bid list for bidding the repair of or of repairing the total
structure." (R. 2654)

He then described how the sheetrock covered

most of the walls and there was no way to determine the extent of
the damages to the studs, joists, and the plumbing, electrical and
heating systems.
8.

(R. 2659, 2661-62)

During May, 1982, Fire Insurance replaced Moser with

a more experienced adjuster, Alan Clapperton. Even though Clapperton had no basis to doubt the validity of the prior three bids (R.
2242-43), he totally disregarded them without notice to or discussion with the Crookstons, their attorney, or the Bank.
1699, 2015-16)
5

(R. 1694,

9.

Knowing that Mr. Rich's report was limited in scope,

Clapperton took the report to Steven Phipps, a licensed contractor
of only three years,

(R. 2592)

Moser, the previous adjuster, had

contacted Phipps in February about possibly preparing a bid but did
not pursue it due to Phipps' lack of experience. (R. 1993, 2584)
When Clapperton contacted Phipps, Clapperton gave Phipps the Rich
report, represented that the report covered all of the damage, and
asked Phipps to prepare a bid based thereon.

(R. 2246) Phipps knew

from prior experience that if he was required to rebuild the
Crookston home, he could submit supplemental bids and be paid for
additional work and materials not described in his original bid. (R.
2610-11) Phipps then prepared a bid in the amount of $27,830.60 and
delivered it to Clapperton on June 14, 1982.
R. 2247)

(Ex. 11, pp. 109-115;

Knowing that his bid would not cover all repairs, Phipps

expressly qualified his bid, stating "This bid is to do only the
items listed here and outlined by the engineer Kent Rich." (Ex. 11,
p. 114)

Phipps did not believe he would be asked to actually

rebuild the home but nonetheless qualified his bid to ensure that if
he were ever requested to rebuild he could supplement his bid for
additional items. (R. 2605, 2621)
10.

Mr. Phipps is the son-in-law of a Farmers Insurance

agent and was doing a substantial amount of insurance repair work
for Fire Insurance through his father-in-law's referrals. (R. 261819, 2593-94) Phipps7 credibility was seriously questioned, not only
because of his bias, but because his bid was wholly inadequate and
disproportionate to the other bids.
6

Phipps admitted at trial that

his bid omitted numerous items that should have been included, such
as the broken cement driveway (R. 2114, 2632-33), the cost of engineer services (R. 2626); numerous building supplies and material
that were destroyed (R. 2634); a large crack in a foundation wall
(Ex. 42, pp. 26-29, R. 2633); the damage to electrical, plumbing and
heating systems (R. 2634-42); sandblasting the interior wall (R.
2634-36); paint, stain and labor relating thereto (R. 2637); waterproofing the outer shell (R. 2638-40); additional interest on the
construction

loan during the rebuilding

numerous other items

(R. 2642-43).

phase

(R. 2644) ; and

Phipps admitted on cross-

examination that his bid was incomplete and that any representation
that his bid would be sufficient to rebuild the home would be
untrue.

(R. 2646-48, 2651-53)
11.

The Phipps bid was based upon salvaging and reusing

most of the interior walls and floors, even though he did not know
whether they could be salvaged. (R. 2627-29)

It was clear from the

evidence that such salvage was impossible. A disinterested witness,
Argen Jager, a contractor of 50 years experience who bought the
collapsed house from the Bank (R. 2665-66), testified that when he
rebuilt the house, he had to completely tear out the interior due to
the extensive damage and was able to salvage very little of the
original building materials. (R. 2666-67)
12.
14, 1982.

Clapperton received the qualified Phipps bid on June

(R. 2247)

Knowing that the bid was inadequate and did

not include all of the amounts owing under the policy (R. 2248-52,

7

2320-21; Ex. 11, p. 114), he immediately called the Bank to arrange
a settlement meeting on June 16.
13.

(R. 2253-54, 2035)

Since March, 1982., Mr. Klemm and the Bank had tele-

phoned Fire Insurance on a regular basis inquiring about settlement.
Fire Insurance continually told them that the adjusters were working
on a settlement, and that they would shortly get back to them with
an offer. (R. 1697-1700, 2033-34)

The Bank had even tried to find

a contractor to bid the repairs, but was unsuccessful.

(R. 2035)

As early as April, Mr. Klemm had made a demand for $50,000.
1695-96)

(R.

Clapperton therefore knew that Mr. Klemm would resist any

settlement based upon the Phipps bid.
14.

On June 16, 1982, Mr. Klemm contacted Clapperton,

expressing concern over the delay and again requesting the status of
the settlement.

(R. 1700-1)

Clapperton told Mr. Klemm that he was

working on the settlement, that he needed a little more time and
that he would shortly be getting back to him with a settlement
proposal. (R. 1700-1)

Clapperton said nothing about the Phipps bid

or the settlement meeting scheduled with the Bank later that day.
15.

Soon after the conversation with Mr. Klemm, Clapper-

ton drove from his Ogden office to Salt Lake City for the purpose of
meeting with the Bank.

(R. 2255)

In this meeting, Clapperton

knowingly misrepresented that he had obtained a complete engineering
report on the damages and had obtained a detailed bid that included
everything necessary to completely rebuild the Crookstons' home.
(R. 2038, 2257)
other bids.

He intentionally concealed the existence of any

(R. 2039)

Clapperton misrepresented that nothing more
8

was owing under the policy than the amount reflected on the Phipps
bid.

(R. 2038)

Clapperton then pressed to settle the matter

immediately for $27,830.60.

(R. 2037) The Bank raised the issue of

$5,014.00 in interest (accruing at approximately 20% per annum, R.
2045) which had accrued on the Crookstons' loan since the collapse.
(R. 2038-39)

Instead of disclosing that the interest would be

covered under the additional living expense coverage, Clapperton
represented that as a demonstration of Fire Insurance's good faith,
he would be willing to pay the interest if the Bank would settle
immediately.

(Ex. 12, p. 2)

16.

Clapperton insisted that the settlement check be

issued directly to the Bank without including the Crookstons' name.
(R. 2037)

Mr. Murdock, the Bank officer, had had only one or two

experiences

involving

loss payee coverage.

(R. 2032)

Being

concerned, he telephoned the Bank's attorney Brent Ward, who advised
that he could proceed with the settlement.

(R. 2037-38) Clapperton

then insisted that the Bank execute a proof of loss form which
contained the following language, "The said company in consideration
of such payment to or for the named insured is hereby discharged
forever from all further claims by reason of said loss or damage."
(Ex. 11, p. 117; R. 2040) The reverse side of the settlement check
given to the Bank also contained a total release of the Bank's
claims for insurance.
17.

(Ex. 16)

Mr. Murdock testified on behalf of the Bank that had

he known about the other bids, he would not have settled for the
$27,830.60, plus interest, because the large discrepancy between the
9

bids would have called into question the validity of the Phipps bid,
(R. 2039-40)

Clapperton admitted that at the time he met with the

Bank, he knew:

(1) the Bank was relying upon the Phipps bid when it

agreed to settle; (2) that the outstanding balance on the loan was
close to $60,000.00; (3) that the settlement amount was insufficient
to prevent the Bank from foreclosing; (4) that the Bank would seek
any deficiency from the Crookstons and foreclose on the Crookstons'
property; and

(5) that experiencing

traumatic to the Crookstons.

foreclosure would be very

(R. 1931, 2238-39f 2261, 2265; Ex. 11,

pp. 84, 86)
18.
settlement.

Clapperton made no effort to advise Mr. Klemm of the
Instead, Mr. Klemm discovered the settlement when he

later contacted the Bank.

(R. 1701-2) Mr. Klemm immediately called

Clapperton who emphatically stated (1) that Fire Insurance had fully
settled all claims under the policy, (2) that the insureds did not
have to be included in the settlement, (3) that nothing more was
owing, and (4) that he was closing his file.

(R. 1703)

Clapperton

then closed his claims file by submitting it to his regional office
in Pocatello (R. 2282-83; Ex. 12, p. 1). He made no further efforts
to communicate with the Crookstons or address their claims.
2279)

(R.

After the settlement, Clapperton knew the Crookstons would

lose their property to the Bank.
19.

(Ex. 15, p. 3)

After the settlement, the Bank advised Mr. Klemm that

it would not rebuild the Crookston home and would commence foreclosure proceedings unless the Crookstons paid the balance of
approximately $23,000.00 owing on the construction loan.
10

(R. 1706)

The Crookstons had depleted their savings and were without means to
pay the Bank.

(R. 1711)

The Crookstons were also being sued by

subcontractors who were foreclosing

on mechanics' liens filed

against the Crookstons' property. Fire Insurance was aware of these
liens.

(R. 1710, 2584; Ex. 26)

After deliberation, Mr. Klemm

recommended bankruptcy and referred the Crookstons to a bankruptcy
attorney, Phil Harding, who also recommended bankruptcy.
1790, 1805, 1815, 1817, 1858-60)

(R. 1709,

The Crookstons were opposed to

bankruptcy (R. 1816-17, 2412, 2119), but felt they had no choice and
filed under Chapter 7 on July 1, 1982.

(Ex. 6) The bankruptcy case

remained open pending the outcome of this case.

(R. 1864) To avoid

additional interest, attorney's fees and costs, the Crookstons
consented to a deed of their property to the Bank in lieu of the
threatened foreclosure. (R. 1713-14; Ex. 30, p.222)
20.

There was overwhelming evidence that Clapperton was

dishonest, not only in his actions at the time of his fraudulent
scheme with the Bank, but also in his testimony at trial.

His

testimony was inconsistent with most other witnesses and documents.
For example, at trial, he denied that his meeting with the Bank was
for the purpose of settlement and claimed that the Bank forced him
into settling.

(R. 2255-56)

Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton's super-

visor, testified, however, that Clapperton told him that he was
leaving the office to settle with the Bank. (R. 1932-33) Clapperton
represented the Phipps bid ($27,830.60) as legitimate and the only
amount owing under the policy even though he knew Fire Insurance's
reserve (estimate of loss for internal accounting purposes) was set
11

at $60,000.

(R. 1912, 1914, 2269-70; Ex. 14)

Clapperton's trial

testimony even differed radically from his deposition testimony on
material issues.

(R. 2269-76, 2280-85)

When his inconsistent

testimony was pointed out to the jury, Clapperton became extremely
nervous and clearly appeared as if he were lying, so much so that
his attorney

in closing statements tried to explain away his

nervousness.

(R. 2714-15)

21.

Milton Beck, an insurance adjuster with 22 years of

experience, and Dr. Paul Randle, a professor of finance who teaches
property and casualty insurance at Utah State University, described
the actions of Fire Insurance as "blatantly outrageous" and "totally
unacceptable" (R. 2334, 2510), outlining the following wrongful
actions:
a.
Excluding the Crookstons from the
settlement negotiations. (R. 2313-14)
b.
Relying on a bid which was almost
one-half of other bids.
Such a discrepancy
would mean there was something wrong with the
low bid. (R. 2314, 2318-19)
c.
Failing to disclose all other bids to
the Bank. (R. 2314-15)
d.
Improperly requiring the Bank to sign
a satisfaction of claim and release without
rebuilding the home. (R. 2316-17)
e.
Requiring the Bank to sign a release
and refusing to deal with the Crookstons thereafter, leaving the Crookstons personally
exposed to further proceedings by the Bank.
(R. 2317)
f.
Representing that the Phipps bid was
adequate and all that was owing under the policy, when there were clearly other coverages and
amounts owing thereunder. (R. 2317-18, 2320-21,
1917-22)

g.
Refusing to include the insureds'
name on a settlement check in payment of a
substantial amount of money. (R. 2321-22)
h.
Representing that engineer Rich's
report was a complete analysis of damage, when
it was not. (R. 2324-25)
i.
Using the Crookstons' failure to sign
a proof of loss form as grounds for denying
their claims, particularly where the Crookstons
were not provided with such a form, and adequate evidence of the loss had been provided to
Fire Insurance. (R. 2325)
j.
Rejecting the bids of Brewster, Stallings and Jones because of insufficient detail,
without requesting the additional information
and detail. (R. 2326-27)
k.
Failing to disclose to the Crookstons
that Fire Insurance was rejecting the other
bids and the reasons therefor. (R. 2327-29)
1.
Not communicating with the Crookstons
during the entire adjusting process. (R. 2329)
m.
Refusing
to consider
additional
claims of the Crookstons after settling with
the Bank, denying responsibility to the insurance commissioner when a complaint was filed by
the Crookstons, and forcing the Crookstons to
bring legal action. (R. 2330-31)
n.
Refusing to clean up after the collapse even after the city had given notice and
threatened to condemn the property due to the
hazardous situation. (R. 2332)
o.
Delaying over six months while the
Crookston home was unfit for occupation, before
making any attempts to settle. (R. 2333)
p.
Maintaining a company policy that the
only duty of an adjuster is to protect the
financial interest of the insurance company and
not the insured. (R. 1894-95, 2333)
22.

In an attempt to seek redress without filing a legal

action, the Crookstons complained to the Utah Insurance Department
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shortly before October 18, 1982.

(R. 2226; Ex. 9, pp. 24-27) Fire

Insurance responded on November 2, 1982, and denied that any amount
was owing to the Crooks tons.

(Ex. 9, pp. 28-31)

The insurance

department finally responded on January 10, 1983, stating that it
did not have the resources to resolve this dispute and suggested
that the Crookstons proceed with legal action.

(R. 1726; Ex. 9, p.

32)
23.

The Crookstons were a typical young married couple

with two children. Each had a very strong work ethic, having worked
most of their lives.

(R. 1995, 2391-92)

Mr. Crookston had been a

certified surgical technician who worked in surgery at the LDS
Hospital

for approximately

six years.

(Ex. 37; R.

1995-2000)

Obtaining a degree would have substantially increased his income.
(R. 1998, 2462-63)

Prior to the settlement with the Bank, Mr.

Crookston was working two other jobs and was attending the University of Utah part-time in order to obtain a degree*

(R. 1997-2000,

2017) The Crookstons were financially meeting all of their obligations until the Bank proceeded with collection of the balance owing
on the construction loan.
24.

(R. 1839, 2018, 2394)

After the settlement, the Crookstons lost all their

savings and everything they had put

into the property.

Mr.

Crookston had a mental collapse, has been unable to complete his
education and be gainfully employed as he had been prior to the
settlement.

(R. 1711, 2124-27, 2197)

Paul Randle, economist,

computed the present value of the Crookstons' total economic loss
since June, 1982, to be $323,399, which amount included some loss of
14

income during the three years after trial while Mr. Crookston
recovered, obtained his degree and became fully employed again.
(Ex's. 1-5; R. 2458-68)
25.

At trial, evidence of Fire Insurance's claims prac-

tices and business philosophy was presented through testimony of its
adjustors and supervisor and through the memoranda, correspondence,
diary, and other documents in the Fire Insurance claim file.
important points include:
a.
Prior to his insurance work, Kent
Soderquist, Clapperton's supervisor, had worked
as a loan officer for a bank and was generally
aware of the Bank's foreclosure rights under
its deed of trust. (R. 1942)
b.
Both Soderquist and Clapperton were
well aware that if insurance proceeds were not
timely and adequately paid, the Bank would
foreclose unless the insureds were able to pay
the underlying loan. (R. 1943, 2236-39, 2265)
c.
Fire Insurance had actual knowledge
that the Bank was proceeding to foreclose on
the Crookstons' property. (R. 2277-79; Exhibit
15 p. 3)
d.
Fire Insurance ratified and approved
all of the actions taken by Moser, Clapperton
and Soderquist. The witnesses testifying in
behalf of Fire Insurance admitted that those
involved were acting within the scope of their
employment and that their activities were
consistent with company policy. (R. 1888-89,
2235) Mr. Moser, who has since been made a
supervisor (R. 1968-69), testified that the
handling of the Crookstons' claim was done
according to company policy, was appropriate,
and was handled in a fashion similar to the
handling of other claims. (R. 2588-89) The
Pocatello regional office and the district
branch claims manager had reviewed the claims
file routinely during all relevant times and
had made various communications to the adjusters. (Exhibits 11, 12 and 13)
15

The

e.
Mr. Soderquist, the supervisor at the
time of the loss, described the claims adjusting philosophy of not just Fire Insurance but
for all Farmer's Insurance Group:
Q:

Now, what is Mr. Moser's duty as it
relates to the loss itself? Does he have
any duty at all to try and find out on his
own what the loss is? . . .

A:

Technically and literally according to the
conditions of the policy, as I would
interpret it, Mr. Moser's only duty was to
the insurance company, which would be to
obtain information to protect the insurance company's interest. . . Any efforts
that Mr. Moser made to help the insured to
prove their loss would be beyond the scope
of his actual duties as an adjuster.

Q:

. . . Are you saying that the adjuster,
Mr. Moser, has no duty to try on his own
to determine the amount of the loss?

A:

Yes, he does, to protect the insurance
company's interests.

Q:

. . . Do you feel that Mr. Moser's duty
was in any way designed to try and protect
the Crookstons or to help them?

A:

Technically, I don't think an adjuster's
duty is to protect the interests of the
insured. I think all insurance companies
do that as a public relations matter, but,
technically they are not required to.

Q:

Was this the position taken by Mr. Moser
and you in the Crookston case?

A:

Yes.

(R. 1893-95; 1885)
f.
The witnesses for Fire Insurance
testified that they believed they had treated
the Crookstons fairly.
(R. 1937)
In fact,
Clapperton had the audacity to expressly state
that he felt good about what he did to the
Crookstons!
(R. 2286)
Fire Insurance has
twice promoted Clapperton since this incident.
He is now the district claims manager supervis16

ing the adjustment of all claims in northern
Utah. (R. 2231-32)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789
(Utah 1991), this Court clarified the relative roles of trial and
appellate courts reviewing a Rule 59(a)(5) motion for new trial or
remittitur.

The trial court has the primary responsibility to

determine whether the jury acted with passion or prejudice, having
the advantage of being present at trial.

The appellate court does

not review the jury award directly but rules on the propriety of the
trial court's ruling on the motion, reversing the trial judge only
if the trial court had no reasonable basis for its decision.
The historically approved ratios of punitive to compensatory damages are not "bright line" ceilings which have the potential
of frustrating the goals of punitive damages —
deterrence.

punishment and

The trial judge may deny a motion for new trial or

remittitur where the ratio

is greater than that historically

approved but must state the reasons therefor in order to permit this
Court to conduct its review of the reasonableness of the decision.
Extreme malice and the probability of recurrence are two factors
which could justify a greater award.

The issue here is whether

Judge Frederick had a reasonable basis for his decision again
denying Fire Insurance's motion.
This Court has emphasized in prior decisions that the
relationship between the actual and punitive damages was only one
factor to be considered and that trial courts must examine at least
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three other principal areas to determine whether an award is appropriate: (1) the nature of the defendant's acts, (2) the probability
of recurrence, and (3) the wealth of the defendant. Judge Frederick
determined that (1) Fire Insurance acted with a high degree of
malice, (2) that it was very likely to repeat its malicious conduct
in the absence of a punitive award, and (3) that a large award was
appropriate in view of Fire Insurance's wealth.
As directed by this Court, Judge Frederick reviewed the
"soft" compensatory damages and found them to be appropriate in view
of the nature of the harm the Crookstons suffered and the malicious
conduct involved.

All factors other than the presumptive ratio

militate in favor of upholding the verdict. Judge Frederick rightfully concluded that the ratio should not subsume consideration of
all other factors.
The trial court did not err in refusing to submit the
ratio to a new jury. This Court did not mandate that the jury be so
instructed and, it would be unwise to do so.

The Court gave the

trial court ample guidance to determine whether the* jury's award was
appropriate and the trial court could have reduced the award if he
deemed it appropriate.

Fire Insurance is improperly inviting this

Court to review de novo the evidence directly rather than review the
trial court's decision.
Fire Insurance's claim that it has been punished enough by
its payment of compensatory damages is illogical.

Under this

theory, the defendant who acts most maliciously and inflicts the
most injury has the least fear of paying punitive damages.
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Fire Insurance's contention that Judge Frederick improperly relied on evidence outside the record is without foundation. The
trial court's findings and conclusions were legitimate and reasonable inferences drawn from evidence and life's experience.
This punitive award

sends society's message to Fire

Insurance, and the insurance industry as a whole, in the language
they understand best —

the language of money.
ARGUMENT

The Crookstons have divided this brief into three principal sections. In Section 1 (Points I and II) , the Crookstons review
the procedural

and

substantive holdings of Crookston v. Fire

Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), hereafter "Crookston.11
In Section 2 (Points III through VIII), the Crookstons demonstrate
why Judge Frederick did not abuse his discretion in denying Fire
Insurance's motion for a new trial or remittitur.

In Section 3

(Points IX through XIV), the Crookstons respond to points raised in
Fire Insurance's principal brief.
I.

IN CROOKSTON, THIS COURT DELINEATED THE RELATIVE
ROLES OF THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT WHEN
REVIEWING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR REMITTITUR.
In Crookston. this Court noted its dissatisfaction with

the inconsistent standards it had previously employed to review
trial court dispositions of Rule 59(a)(5) motions.
P.2d at 802.

Crookston, 817

In some cases the Court had focused on the trial

court's ruling, while in others, the Court appeared to review the
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jury award directly.

The Court thereafter clarified the relative

roles of the trial and appellate courts.

Ibid.

A. The Trial Court Exercises Supervisory Control Over the Jury to
Ensure Justice.
1.

The jury award must meet the trial court/s approval.
In Crookston, this Court, citing Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co. v. Yeatts. 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941), reiterated the well
established principle that jurors "are not, and have never been,
independent of the court of which they are a part, but their
verdicts must meet the approval, or at least they must not offend
the sense of justice, of the presiding judge" who, in essence, sits
as the "thirteenth juror."

Crookston, at 803, fn. 15.

The trial

judge's responsibility is to ensure justice:
We have indeed frequently affirmed the importance of trial by jury. However, it must be
realized that even a jury is not so sacrosanct
as to be beyond the possibility of error. Like
other aspects of authority in our system of
government under law, it is essential that
there be some check against arbitrariness,
abuse or mistake. The safeguard against this
is the authority of the trial judge who has
supervisory control over the proceedings and is
charged with the ultimate responsibility of
seeing that justice is done. To accomplish
that purpose it is essential that his power to
grant or deny motions for new trial be recognized.
Hvland Hospital v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d
736, 738 (1967).
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2.

Because the trial court occupies an advantaged
position, it has the primary responsibility of
reviewing the award to determine if it is
excessive.

In Crookston. this Court emphasized that the trial court
has the primary responsibility of reviewing the amount of punitive
damage awards, because the trial court is best equipped to perform
the review:
The reason that any determination as to whether
the jury exceeded its proper bounds is best
made in the first instance by the trial court
is that the trial judge is present during all
aspects of the trial and listens to and views
all witnesses. Therefore, he or she can best
determine if the jury has acted with "passion
or prejudice" and whether the award was too
small or too large in light of the evidence.
Crookston. 817 P.2d at 804.
B. This Court Reviews the Propriety of the Trial Courtis Ruling on
a Motion for New Trial.
1.

This Court neither retries facts nor reviews
the jury award directly.

In Crookston, the Court reiterated the long-standing
principle that the Court "do[es] not sit to retry the facts."
Crookston. 817 P.2d at 800. Furthermore, the Court's proper role is
to review the trial court's ruling rather than the jury verdict
directly.

Id. at 813.

In performing this review, the appellate

court accords the trial court deference due to the trial judge's
advantaged position to "appraise the witnesses and the evidence."
Id. at 811. Accordingly, this Court reverses the trial court ruling
on the motion only where the Court determines that the trial court
had no reasonable basis for its decision.
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Id. at 805.

2.

The trial court must articulate the
basis for its ruling.

Although the Court gives deference to the trial court's
ruling, the trial court must articulate the basis for its decision.
Id. at 804, citing Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 178
(1940) .

The reasons for this requirement are thrcse-fold.

First,

the articulation requires the trial court to carefully review and
analyze the trial in terms of the facts and the law to reach a
reasoned decision.

("The exercise of judicial discretion must be

based upon some facts notwithstanding great latitude* is accorded the
trial court in such matters."

Saltas. 105 P.2d at 178). Second,

the requirement allows the appellate court to review the trial
court's decision without having to peruse the evidence, the record,
and the instructions "to search out possible reasons for agreeing or
disagreeing with the trial court in the exercise of a discretion."
Ibid.

Third, the requirement functions as "a mechanism for the

further development of the law." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 813. Taken
as a whole, the process ensures reasoned review of the motion at
both trial and appellate court levels.
II.

THE COURT HAS RECOGNIZED THAT A TRIAL COURT
NEED NOT NECESSARILY GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR
REMITTITUR IF THE PUNITIVE AWARD EXCEEDS
HISTORICALLY APPROVED RATIOS.
After having established the relative roles of the trial

judge and appellate court, the Court in Crookston discussed the
substantive standards applicable to a punitive damage award.

The

Court first noted that historically it had identified seven factors
to be considered:
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The relative wealth of the defendant;
the nature of the alleged misconduct;
the facts and circumstances surrounding
such conduct;
the effect thereof on the lives of the
plaintiff and others;
the probability of future recurrence of
the misconduct;
the relationship of the parties; and
the amount of actual damages awarded.

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808.

Thereafter, the Court commented:

Our cases have done little more than list these
factors. No relative weights have been assigned them, and no standards or formulas have been
established for properly evaluating them when
making an award or when reviewing the propensity [sic] of a jury award.
Ibid.
The Court further observed that other courts had struggled
with similar difficulties and that some jurisdictions had resorted
to "bright line" limits on punitive damages.

However, the Court

opined that "bright line" standards, while having the advantage of
certainty, also have the disadvantage of inflexibility, which "could
potentially defeat the very purpose of punitive damages."
809.

Id. at

After discussing the weaknesses inherent in the "strict list

of factors" approach and the "ceiling" approach standing alone, the
Court adopted a "middle ground."

Ibid.

Based on prior cases, the Court determined that:
The general rule to be drawn from our past
cases appears to be that where the punitives
are well below $100,000, punitive damages
beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages have
seldom been upheld and that where the award is
in excess of $100,000, we have indicated some
inclination to overturn awards having ratios of
less than 3 to 1.

23

Id. at 810.

However, recognizing the inherent weakness of the

"bright line" approach, the Court held that a trial court is not
bound by the "presumptive ratio:"
In these patterns, we find that guidelines
emerge for trial courts faced with challenges
to punitive damage awards on the grounds of
excessiveness under rule 59(a)(5).
If the
ratio of punitive to actual damages falls
within the range that this court has consistently upheld, then the trial court may assume
that the award is not excessive. In denying a
rule 59(a) (5) motion for a new trial, the trial
court need not give any detailed explanation
for its decision if the punitive damage award
falls within this ratio range. If the award
exceeds the ratios set by our past pattern of
decision, the trial court is not bound to
reduce it. However, if such an award is upheld, the trial judge must make a detailed and
reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the award is not excessive in
light of the law and the facts. The judge's
articulation should generally be couched in
terms of one or more of the seven factors we
earlier listed as proper considerations in
determining the amount of punitive dcimages.
unless some other factor seems compelling to
the trial court, [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 811.

The Court explicitly noted such factors as extreme

malice or the need for deterrence as bases for denying a Rule 59
motion even where the ratio of the punitive award to compensatory
damages was larger than that historically approved.

Ibid.

In remanding Fire Insurance's motion to the trial court,
this Court stated that it was not expressing any opinion as to
whether a remittitur should be granted.

However, it did note that

if the trial court did again deny the motion, the trial court should
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explain its reasons for doing so under the standards set out in
Crookston.

Id. at 812.

Since the trial court has again denied Fire Insurance's
motion, it is the Court's duty to review the ruling to determine
whether Judge Frederick had a reasonable basis for his decision.
III.

WHERE THE PUNITIVE AWARD EXCEEDS HISTORICALLY
APPROVED RATIOS, THE COURT SHOULD EXAMINE THREE
PRINCIPAL AREAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE AWARD
IS EXCESSIVE.
The Court did not discuss the framework it would utilize

in reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial where
the punitive award exceeded the presumptive ratio.

However, the

tenor of the opinion appeared to invite further development of the
law once the trial court had made its ruling:
Finally, through the requirement of an articulation of reasons for sustaining or modifying
damage awards, we establish a mechanism for the
further development of the law.
Id. at 813. Crookstons submit that the trial court's ruling should
be evaluated against a framework derived from prior case law.
The middle ground approach taken in Crookston is consistent with this Court's prior decisions holding that the relationship
between compensatory and punitive damages is not the sole criterion
in determining whether a punitive award is excessive.

In Terry v.

Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979)
(reversed on other grounds, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980)), the jury
awarded general damages of $2,500 and punitive damages of $15,000
against ZCMI for false arrest and imprisonment.

The trial judge

reduced the punitive award, stating that the punitive damages had to
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bear a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages.

On

appeal, this Court reinstated the jury's punitive award, noting that
exclusive reliance on the relationship test frustrates the purposes
of punitive damages:
This court recently stated that "while the
cases generally hold that the amount of punitive damages must bear some reasonable relation
to the amount of actual damages awarded, this
is not necessarily true." The purposes of a
punitive or exemplary damage award is not to
compensate the party harmed but rather to
punish the wrongdoer, to deter him from similar
acts in the future, and to provide fair warning
to others similarly situated that such conduct
will not be tolerated.
Due to the purposes underlying the award of
punitive damages many factors contribute in
determining their appropriate measure. While
the amount of compensatory damages awarded is
one such factor, it is not the exclusive one.
The jury in its original decision or the court
in its review of that decision must also consider the particular nature of the defendant's
acts, the probability of those acts being
repeated in the future, and the relative wealth
of the particular defendant. [Emphasis cidded.]
Id. at 328.

The Court's approach in Terry provides the model for

analysis here. Where the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages is higher than that historically recognized, this Court
should focus on the trial court's conclusions as to the nature of
defendant's acts, the probability of recurrence, and defendant's
wealth. Judge Frederick's ruling was reasonable when considered in
light of his findings that Fire Insurance acted with a high degree
of malice, that there was a significant probability that the conduct
would

recur,

and

that

Fire

Insurance's

significant punitive award.
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wealth

justified

a

IV.

JUDGE FREDERICK CONCLUDED THAT FIRE INSURANCE
ACTED WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF MALICE.

A.
This Court Has Held that Fire Insurance Acted With the Requisite Mental State for Punitive Damages.
In Crookston, the Court repeated the well-established
principle that punitive damages are allowed only where there is
willful and malicious conduct or conduct which manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the rights of
others.

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807.

The Court affirmed Judge

Fredericks finding that punitive damages were appropriate:
[W]e hold that the trial court correctly concluded that Fire Insurance had acted with the
mental state required for punitives.
Ibid.
B.
The Size of the Punitive Award Should Reflect the Degree of
Reprehensibilitv of the Conduct.
The law recognizes that within the realm of egregious
conduct, there are differing degrees of reprehensibility:
One factor is the particular nature of the
defendant's acts in light of the whole record;
clearly, different acts may be of varying
degrees of reprehensibility, and the more
reprehensible the act, the greater the appropriate punishment, assuming all other factors
are equal.
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 582 P.2d 980, 990 (Cal. 1978),
cited in Terry. supra, at 328 fn. 54. Both the jury and trial court
found

that

the

acts

of

Fire

reprehensible.
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Insurance

were

egregious

and

C.
Fire Insurance Preyed Upon the Crookstons When They Were in a
State of Helplessness.
This Court has generally upheld punitive awards where the
plaintiff was disadvantaged in some respect at the time of defendant's anti-social behavior. See, Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766
(Utah 1985) — plaintiff, an older gentlemen, was under pressure of
foreclosure when approached by defrauder; Elkinaton v. Foust, 618
P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) —

stepdaughter abused by stepfather from age 9

to age 16; and Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952)
—

plaintiff in delicate health at time of assault.
Here, the trial court found that the Crookstons were

particularly vulnerable when Fire Insurance engaged in this fraud.
After their home had collapsed, Crookstons had no means to pay the
bank loan and were being forced into bankruptcy.

R. 03203.

The

Court further found that Fire Insurance's conduct was especially
reprehensible in light of the nature of Fire Insurance's business,
the selling of hope to those injured by calamitous events.

R.

03239.
Fire Insurance, invited the Crookstons to purchase insurance on the assumption that Fire Insurance would provide "fast,
fair, friendly service" in their hour of need. However, when called
upon to perform, Fire Insurance victimized the Crookstons. It takes
a particularly insensitive and calloused attitude to engage in this
genre of reprehensible behavior.
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D. The Trial Court Noted an Astonishing Moral Blindness Among Fire
Insurance's Employees,
In his memorandum decision, Judge Frederick found that:
Fire Insurance's adjusters acknowledged that the purpose of insurance was to prevent extreme financial hardship and loss of property
which would otherwise occur if a claim is not paid; Clapperton and
the other adjusters knew that Crookstons faced foreclosure if Fire
Insurance

did

not

perform;

notwithstanding

this

knowledge,

Clapperton acted with total indifference to the Crookston's plight.
R. 03203(a).
Fire Insurance remained insensitive to the Crookstons at
trial, where Moser testified that Fire Insurance had treated the
Crookstons fairly; Clapperton, the perpetrator of the fraud, had the
audacity to testify that he "felt good" about what he had done to
the Crookstons; and incredibly Fire Insurance's representatives
testified that they considered their activities to be sound business
practices.

R. 03203(a)-03204.

This apparent moral blindness was not confined to the Utah
claims office.
and

Judge Frederick observed that the regional office

district branch

routinely,

claims manager reviewed

communicated

with

the

adjusters,

approved of all actions taken by its agents.

the claims files
and

ratified

and

R. 03203(a).

In view of all the testimony, Judge Frederick concluded:
The evidence supporting Fire Insurance's position with regard to the adjustment of the
Crookstons' claim and Fire Insurance's apparent
satisfaction with the manner in which its own
insureds were treated represents both to this
Court and apparently to the jury, that illwill, malice and/or total indifference to the
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Crookstons was its attitude. Having sought an
inadequate bid, and having excluded the
Crookstons
from
the
negotiations,
Fire
Insurance was in total control of the settlement with the bank. Knowing that the settlement would have a devastating impact on the
Crookstons, Clapperton nevertheless proceeded
in a fraudulent, malicious fashion with one
goal in mind: to cheat the plaintiffs out of
their just due and thereby presumably improve
his standing with his employer.
By their
actions, the agents and representatives of Fire
Insurance demonstrated either actual malice and
ill will toward the Crookstons and intended the
consequence
of
their
actions,
or
Fire
Insurance7s agents acted wrongfully, solely to
further their own financial well-being, despite
actual knowledge of devastating harm to the
Crookstons.
R. 03207-03208. Judge Frederick reiterated his view of the extreme
degree of malice shown by Fire Insurance later in his opinion,
stating:
Moreover, it is this Court's view that Fire
Insurance has displayed an extremely high
degree of malice, with actual intent to harm
for the benefit of its own financial interests,
or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great harm to the plaintiffs based upon
the reprehensible nature of the acts involved.
R. 03217.
V.

JUDGE FREDERICK IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT FACTORS
WHICH PORTEND A RECURRENCE OF FIRE INSURANCE'S
CONDUCT.

A. The Court Should Examine the Probability of Recurrence in Terms
of Opportunity, Incentive, Potential Restraints and Attitude.
As noted in Terry, one of the primary purposes of punitive
damages is to deter the defendant and others similarly situated from
repeating anti-social behavior. Hence, although the probability of
recurrence is only one of the list of factors noted by the Court in
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Crookston, the Court should give significant weight to it.

The

punitive award should be proportionate to the likelihood that the
conduct may recur to prevent further harm to society. In its cases,
the Court has identified several considerations relevant to the
probability of recurrence.
1.

Opportunity.

The Court indirectly referred to opportunity in Bundy v.
Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984), where the
Court

reduced the punitive damages, stating that

the conduct

occurred in circumstances so unique that it was unlikely that the
conduct would be repeated.

However, the converse is also true.

Where the circumstances are likely to recur with frequency, the
perpetrator may well be tempted to repeat his conduct.
2.

Incentive.

This Court has previously held that a punitive award must
be sufficient to deter a defendant who engages in malicious conduct
for financial gain. In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675
P.2d 1179, 1187 (Utah 1983), the Court stated that punitive damages
must be appropriate to "take the profit out of wrongdoing."
3.

Availability of other restraints.

Punitive damages are designed to deter "outrageous and
malicious conduct which is not likely to be deterred by other
means."

Behrens, supra, at 1186.

To the extent that there are

other mechanisms available to deter wrongful conduct, punitive
damages assume a smaller role. By contrast, where there appears to
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be no other reasonable restraints, punitive damages assume much
greater importance.
4.

The defendant's attitude.

Although the Court has not heretofore focused on the
defendants attitude in reviewing the probability of recurrence, it
seems apparent that the defendant's attitude is significant.

If a

defendant fails to recognize the anti-social nature of the prior
acts, it is more likely that the defendant will continue the illegal
behavior unless checked.
B.
The Trial Court Found Factors Which Pointed to a Probability
that Fire Insurance Would Continue Its Malicious Behavior.
1.

Opportunity.

Judge Frederick noted that Fire Insurance has four claims
offices located in Utah, each of which handles 4,000 to 5,000 claims
a year.

R. 03211.

Each of these 16,000 to 20,000 yearly claims

presents an opportunity for Fire Insurance to engage in wrongful
conduct for profit.
2.

Incentive.

Judge Frederick wrote:
In the absence of punitive damages, Fire
Insurance may well find that it is profitable
to continue its illegal conduct, even though it
may incur the cost of compensatory damages from
time to time.
R. 03211.
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3-

Availability of restraints.

Judge Frederick determined there was a significant lack of
internal restraints on Fire Insurance.

Its management ratified

Clapperton's conduct and, indeed, appeared to applaud the conduct by
twice promoting Clapperton, who now serves as claims manager for all
claims processed

in northern Utah.

R. 03203(a)-03204.

Fire

Insurance also ignored an external check on its conduct.

After

Clapperton closed his file, the Crookstons appealed to the insurance
department for assistance. This regulatory agency had no deterrent
effect on Fire Insurance, as evidenced by Fire Insurance's denial of
any liability to the Crookstons.
4.

R. 03240.

Attitude.

Judge Frederick found that Fire Insurance acted with a
high degree of malice. Significantly, Judge Frederick recorded that
at trial, nearly six years after the incident, Fire Insurance was
not the least inclined to change its practices:
It is the view of this Court, that Fire
Insurance's conduct and lack of remorse incident thereto demonstrate a calculated and
calloused attitude toward the settlement of
claims, and this is in accord with what agents
of Fire Insurance perceive to be in keeping
with their company policy.
*

*

*

There was no evidence at all at trial that the
practices and procedures involved have in any
manner been changed by Fire Insurance. There
was no indication of contrition or remorse,
and, in fact, it appeared that Fire Insurance
was pleased with the outcome of the adjustment
of the loss, and to this day has failed or
refused to recognize the wrong that it has
wrought upon the plaintiffs.
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R. 03211, 03217.
5.

Reasonable Conclusions.

In view of the evidence, it was certainly reasonable for
Judge Frederick to conclude that there was a great risk that Fire
Insurance would continue to engage in wrongful conduct absent a
significant punitive damage award.

Fire Insurance had the oppor-

tunity to continue its conduct in view of the thousands of claims
processed annually.

Fire Insurance certainly has the incentive to

maximize its profits.

There are no internal constraints, and Fire

Insurance ignored the regulatory agency's attempts.

Finally, and

most importantly, in view of the attitudes manifested at trial, the
jury and the trial court were well within their province to conclude
that a large punitive damage award was society's only tool to check
Fire Insurance.
VI.

THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD WAS APPROPRIATE IN
LIGHT OF FIRE INSURANCE'S WEALTH.

A.
The Term "Relative Wealth" Has Various Meanings, Each Relevant
to a Determination of the Propriety of a Punitive Damage Award.
The phrase "relative wealth" has no meaning until one
defines the subject to which the wealth is compared.

Historically,

the Court has compared a defendants wealth to the punitive award
itself.
1.

However, other comparisons are also meaningful.
Defendants wealth relative to the punitive award.
When comparing the defendant's wealth to the punitive

award,

the

Court has attempted

to achieve

a balance between

deterrence and the defendant's ability to pay.

This balancing was
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most clearly demonstrated in Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah
1983).

In Cruz, the defendant had battered the plaintiff after an

argument in a restaurant.

The jury awarded the plaintiff special

damages of $580, general damages of $9,000, and punitive damages of
$12,000.

In discussing the deterrent effect of punitive damages,

the Court wrote:
Punitive damages should be more than an inconvenience to [the defendant].
Their amount
should be sufficient to discourage him, or
anyone similarly situated, from repeating such
conduct in the future.
Id. at 727. The Court noted that the defendant, a salaried police
officer, had a semi-monthly disposable income of $567.05.

Since

there had been no evidence at trial relative to the defendant's
assets, the Court reduced the punitive award to $6,000.

However,

the Court cautioned:
This reduction should in no way be taken to
condone [the defendant's] deplorable actions.
Ibid. Although the Court may reduce an award which is excessive in
comparison to the defendant's resources, the damage award must be of
sufficient size relative to the defendant's wealth to achieve its
deterrent effect.
2.

Defendant's wealth relative to the plaintiff.

Although not previously noted by the Court, there is a
meaningful comparison between the wealth of the defendant and the
plaintiff. In our society, wealth equates to power, and where there
is a great disparity between the wealth of the defendant and the
plaintiff, the defendant may tend to exploit its wealth to oppress
35

the weaker plaintiff, particularly when the plaintiff is financially
destitute.
3.

Defendants wealth relative to society.

Since wealth equates to power, a wealthy defendant has the
capacity to affect many lives.

Thus, when there is a probability

that a wealthy defendant will repeat its conduct, there is a greater
risk to society as a whole both in terms of the extent and severity
of harm.
B.
The Trial Courtis Ruling Was Reasonable
"Relative Wealth" Analysis.
1.

in Light of the

Wealth relative to the punitive award.

As noted by Judge Frederick, during 1986, the year preceding the trial, Fire Insurance's total assets were $723,468,116; its
total underwriting, investment and other income was $595,284,582,
and its net income was $23,000,000. R. 03204. Judge Frederick then
compared the punitive award of $4 million to Fire Insurance's total
assets and observed that the punitive award constituted approximately one-half of one percent of its assets.
Because

the

amount

is

large

R. 03205.
in

the

abstract,

Fire

Insurance desires to focus only on the total punitives of $4,000,000
without putting it into context. However, the pertinent inquiry is
relative wealth.
The ratio of the punitive award to each of the foregoing
figures is as follows:
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Punitive damages to total assets
4,000,000 -5- 723,468,116 = .55%
Punitive damages to total annual income
4,000,000 -f 595,284,582 = .67%
Punitive damages to net annual income
4,000,000 4- 23,000,000 = 17.4%
In view of the Court's prior caselaw, a punitive award amounting to
17% of a defendant's annual net income is not excessive.

In Cruz,

supra, this Court, without evidence of the defendant's assets,
reduced the punitive damage award from $12,000 (88% of the defendant's net annual income) to $6,000 (44% of the net annual income).
Here, the evidence demonstrated that Fire Insurance had threequarters of a billion dollars in assets and the punitive award, as
a percentage of Fire Insurance's net income, was less than one-half
of that approved in Cruz.
Most individuals are not accustomed to dealing in millions
of dollars.

However, multi-million dollar corporations deal with

millions like individuals deal with hundreds or thousands. Therefore, "relative wealth" is best illustrated by moving the decimal of
each figure to the left by 3 digits: $723,468 compared to $4,000;
$595,468 compared to $4,000; $23,000 compared to $4,000. The ratios
are still the same and appear quite acceptable.

No one could

seriously consider excessive a $4,000 punitive award against a
defendant who possesses assets of $723,000.

While taking $4,000

from that defendant's $23,000 annual income may sting, that is the
purpose of punitive damages. In any event, the assets available to
defendant obviously compensate.
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2.

Fire Insurance's wealth relative to
the Crookstons.

The trial court noted the enormous disparity

in the

resources available to Fire Insurance and the Crookstons:
It goes without saying that there is no
rational comparison between Fire Insurance's
assets and income to that of plaintiffs. They
are bankrupt.
R. 03205.

This large corporation, having assets of three quarters

of a billion dollars, literally crushed the Crookstons.

The fact

that this case has been in litigation for more than nine years amply
attests

to

Fire

Insurance's

ability

to

oppress

and

try

the

plaintiffs' emotional and financial endurance.
3.

Fire Insurance's wealth relative to society.

Fire Insurance does a substantial amount of business in
our country.

It operates four claims offices in this state, each

office processing approximately 4,000 to 5,000 claims annually.
Unless restrained, Fire Insurance with its substantial resources
poses a significant threat to society in terms of the number people
potentially affected and the nature of harm inflicted.
VII. JUDGE FREDERICK REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
PUNITIVE AWARD WAS JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE
HARD AND SOFT COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.
In
regarding

Crookston,

the

"soft" compensatory

Court

expressed

some

skepticism

damages because of the

difficulty of attaching a value to them.

inherent

In remanding the motion,

this Court stated that if Judge Frederick again denied defendant's
motion for new trial or remittitur, he must explain the reasons for
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the denial "given the large proportion of compensatory damages
arguably attributable to emotional distress or loss of financial
reputation."

Id. at p. 812.

However, the Court did not give the

trial court any guidance as to what standard Judge Frederick should
employ

to determine whether the

"soft" damages were suspect.

Nevertheless, after examining this issue, Judge Frederick expressly
determined that the "soft" damages awarded were appropriate.
A.
The Extent and Nature of Crookstons/ "Soft" Damages Were Real
and Were to Be Reasonably Expected Given Fire Insurance's Malicious
Behavior.
After reviewing the evidence, the trial court stated:
The plaintiffs each testified at trial to the
devastating effect the actions of Fire Insurance had on their personal lives. They suffered serious emotional and nervous conditions,
which were of long-standing nature, and the
devastation testified to continued from the
date of the loss, at least through the trial
(approximately six years).
In addition, the
plaintiffs were forced to file bankruptcy and
lost, as a result, all of their savings and the
lot they had purchased upon which to build
their "dream home."
R. 03208-03209.

The effect of Fire Insurance's malicious behavior

extended beyond the Crookstons, affecting the plaintiffs' parents,
the Crookston's creditors, the bank, subcontractors, and ultimately
the city which was forced to remove the hazardous condition posed to
the neighborhood children by the devastated home.

Ibid.

In referring to his own impressions regarding the evidence, Judge Frederick wrote:
Though the amount of so-called "soft" damages
comprises approximately 60% of the total compensatory damage award, those damages were
nevertheless real, and represented suffering
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and loss sustained by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' emotional distress was severe and of
long-standing duration. The jury was instructed as to what properly constitutes emotional
distress, pain and suffering.
The Supreme
Court has affirmed that determination by the
jury as being well within their discretion.
This Court's view is that the jury's finding
was appropriate and supported by the evidence.

The problem is not that emotional harm should
not be compensated, but how to insure that the
damages awarded are commensurate with the emotional harm. In addressing the problem, courts
often consider whether there is physical harm
associated with the mental harm. Courts also
examine the conduct of the defendant to determine whether emotional harm will naturally and
reasonably follow therefrom.

The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and
outrageous.
There is nothing fictitious or
trivial about the Crookstons' bankruptcy and
the loss of their home and property. Given the
egregious conduct and succeeding events, there
is no doubt that the Crookstons' claims for
mental distress are real, unfeigned, and far
from trivial and therefore should be viewed as
real damage. [Emphasis added.]
R. 03215, 03216.

There is no doubt that Judge Frederick was

satisfied that in view of the harm inflicted on the Crookstons, the
jury's award of "soft" compensatory damages was appropriate.
B.
Based on an Historical Review, the Ratio of the "Soft" to
"Hard" Damages Demonstrates That Judge Frederick's Decision Was
Reasonable.
In Crookston, the Court expressed its concern that the
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages not be skewed by a
disproportionate award of "soft" damages. This Court can verify the
propriety of Judge Frederick's conclusion regarding the compensatory
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damages by employing an historical analysis analogous to that
developed in Crookston.
In Cruz v, Montova. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), this Court
reduced the punitive award based principally on the defendant's lack
of resources.

However, the Court also observed that the jury had

been generous in the award of general damages.

In Cruz, the jury

had awarded $580 "special" damages, (i.e, economic loss) and $9,000
general damages, (i.e. pain and suffering).

The ratio of the

general damages to special damages in Cruz was a little more than
15:1.

Cruz stands for the proposition that general damages in a

ratio of 15:1 to economic loss are "generous."
On the other hand, where the conduct has been egregious
and the nature of the resulting harm was reasonably expected, the
Court has upheld punitive damages where the ratio of general to
special damages has been as large as 3.8:1.

In Elkincrton v. Foust,

618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980), the plaintiff brought an action against her
father who had sexually assaulted her during her youth.

The jury

awarded $2,600 special damages and $10,000 general damages.

This

Court upheld the punitive award as not being excessive in view of
the innate evils of the conduct and the far reaching harm on the
plaintiff and others.
In this case, Judge Frederick noted that Crookstons'
"hard" damages also included $175,000 in attorneys fees and $11,126
in expenses and costs.

Had the case of Canyon Country Store v.

Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), been decided before the trial
court awarded fees, the Crookstons would have also been entitled to
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an additional $151,330 in attorneys fees based on the actual contingent fee paid.

In total, the out-of-pocket loss to the Crookstons,

including attorneys fees and costs was $660,855. The "soft" damages
amounted to $492,427.

In this case the ratio of the "soft" to

"hard" damages was less than one, i.e. $492,427 -5- $660,855 = .745.
This ratio is approximately 5% of the ratio found overly generous in
Cruz and 20% of the ratio which appeared satisfactory in Elkinaton.
Although the jury awarded a significant amount of "soft" compensatory damages, the award was appropriate in view of the equally
significant amount of economic losses and harm inflicted on the
Crookstons.
C.
The Nature of the Insurance Industry and its Marketing
Practices Militate Against Reduction of the Punitive Award Based on
the Hard/Soft Damages Distinction.
When discussing the hard/soft damages in Crookston, the
Court relied upon previous cases, none of which concerned the
insurance industry.

However, the unique nitch occupied by the

industry distinguishes this case from historical precedent.
It would be a significant irony for a court to remit a
punitive award against an insurer because a substantial portion of
the compensatory award consisted of "soft" damages.

The industry

advertises to obtain perspective buyers on the assumption that in
time of emotional turmoil the insureds will have peace of mind.
Because the industry presents itself as one whose faithful service
prevents soft damages, an insurer, who has maliciously injured an
insured should not benefit by reducing punitive damages just because

42

the malicious conduct created the emotional turmoil the insurer had
promised to prevent.
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY BALANCED THE
FACTORS TO FURTHER SOCIETY'S GOALS OF
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE.

A.
The Punitive Award Must be Proportionate to the Nature of the
Acts as well as the Harm.
This

Court

has

held

that

punitive

damages

must

appropriate for the nature of the act and the harm done.

be

See,

Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975) and Elkinaton v.
Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980).

Here, Judge Frederick reason-

ably determined that Fire Insurance displayed a high degree of
malice in defrauding the Crookstons and that the Crookstons suffered
a significant degree of harm.

Accordingly, the punitive award

should reflect the aggravated nature of the conduct as well as the
significant injuries inflicted.
B.
The Punitive Award Must Be Sufficient to Force Fire Insurance
to Change Its Practices.
The punitive award must be proportional to the risk posed
by continued anti-social behavior.

Fire Insurance has abundant

opportunities and incentive to continue its unlawful activities.
Judge Frederick, weighing these factors with Fire

Insurance's

calloused attitude toward claims processing, the lack of external
constraints, and the potential harm to society, reasonably found the
punitive award appropriate.
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c

*

Fire Insurance's Wealth Militates in Favor of the Award.
Although four million dollars is significant, the award

will not under any reasonable view of the evidence significantly
impair Fire Insurance's ability to continue its business.

Such an

award, however, does have the desired effect of preventing Fire
Insurance from absorbing the award as a mere cost of doing business.
D.
The Ratio of the Punitive Award to the Compensatory Damages
Cannot Be Allowed to Subsume All Other Considerations.
Of all the factors relevant to punitive dcimages, only one,
the ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages, could
possibly favor a reduction of the punitive award. However, as Judge
Frederick properly held, this sole factor should not subordinate
consideration of all other factors.

He concluded:

If the facts of this case do not warrant
deviation from the historically approved ratio
of punitives to compensatory damages, it is
difficult if not impossible for this Court to
conceive of a fact situation wherein a
deviation is warranted.
R. 03218.
IX.

JUDGE FREDERICK DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO EMPANEL A JURY TO REASSESS PUNITIVE
DAMAGES.
Fire Insurance argues that even though this Court did not

explicitly direct a retrial, the trial court should have granted a
new jury on the basis that overruling precedent should be applied
retroactively.
respects.

Fire

Insurance's argument

is

First, the jury was not standardless.

flawed

in three

Second, the only

new standard is the trial court's consideration of a historical
44

ratio as it reviews the jury award.

Third, the trial court had

discretion in granting a new trial.
A.

The Jury's Discretion Was Not Standardless.
Fire Insurance has selectively quoted from Crookston,

inferring that the Court found a defect in the standards used in the
jury instructions.

Reference to the opinion, on the contrary,

demonstrates that the Court unambiguously determined that Utah#s
prior and current case law meets constitutional muster.
In its first appeal, Fire Insurance argued that the punitive damages violated due process.

In disposing of this argument,

the Court first noted that Fire Insurance had not properly raised
the state constitutional claim.

Crookston, at 800-801. Turning to

the federal constitutional argument, the Court rejected defendant's
claim, ruling that this Court's standards "are at least as stringent
as, if not more stringent than" those affirmed in the United States
Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991).

U.S.

Ibid.

In Pacific Mutual, the plaintiff brought an action against
her health insurer claiming that the insurer had defrauded her in
refusing to pay $4,000 in medical expenses.

After finding fraud,

the jury awarded $200,000 in compensatory and $840,000 in punitive
damages. After reviewing the jury instruction on punitive damages1,
both the Alabama and United States Supreme Courts affirmed the
award, despite the insurer's constitution attack.

See Exhibit C for full text of the instruction.
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The punitive

damage

instructions

in this

case

(see

Exhibits D and E), were far more restrictive and enlightening than
the instruction approved in Pacific Mutual.

The Alabama court

merely instructed the jury that punitive damages were not compensatory and that the jury in fixing the amount was to consider the
character of the wrong as well as the necessity of preventing
similar wrongs. The instruction here carefully instructed the jury
as to the nature of punitive damages —

that they were to be given

with caution and that in determining the amount the jury was to
consider the seven factors.

Because the jury here was far better

instructed than the jury in Pacific Mutual, Fire Insurance errs in
its claim of inadequate standards.
B. The Standards Announced in Crookston Apply to The Trial Court's
Consideration of the Motion for New Trial or Remittitur.
This Court in Crookston reviewed its prior decisions and
synthesized a guideline regarding the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages. Fire Insurance argues this ratio was a "new"
standard which should be submitted to a jury.

The text of the

Crookston opinion demonstrates that the ratio test is a barometer
for the trial court's use in reviewing punitive awards.

Had this

Court concluded that it was necessary for a new trial based on a
"new" standard, the Court would have unambiguously ordered such a
result, as it did in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d
98 (Utah 1985).
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C.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing to
Submit the Punitive Damage Issue to a New Jury.
Even though this Court did not mandate a new trial, Fire
Insurance nonetheless argues that the trial court should have done
so.

However, even a cursory analysis demonstrates that the alleged

benefits of doing so were far outweighed by the costs.
In Vaughn v. Murray, 521 P.2d 262 (Kan. 1974), a case upon
which this Court previously relied in Loyal Order of Moose, No. 259
v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982), the Kansas Supreme
Court listed the factors that a court should consider in retrospective application of an overruling decision:
Courts have given attention to various factors
in determining whether or not they should apply
an overruling decision retroactively. Some of
the factors which have been considered are:
(1) Justifiable reliance on the earlier law;
(2) The nature and purpose of the overruling
decision; (3) Res judicata; (4) Vested rights,
if any, which may have accrued by reason of the
earlier law; and (4) [sic] The effect retroactive application may have on the administration of justice in the courts.
Vaughn, 521 P.2d at 269. Three of the five factors have particular
relevance here.
1.

Justifiable reliance on the earlier law.

The jury instructions given in this action listed the same
seven factors which have been repeatedly relied upon by the Utah
courts in assessing punitive damages and were again reaffirmed by
this Court in Crookston.
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2.

Nature and purpose of overruling decision.

This Court did not direct the trial courts to submit the
ratio test to the jury for use in its deliberations. Submitting the
test to the jury would be ill advised, since the jury may very well
distort the compensatory damage award in order to bring the punitive
damage award within the ratio.

See, American College of Trial

Lawyers, Report on Punitive Damages of the Committee on Special
Problems in the Administration of Justice, p. 15 (Mar. 3, 1989).
Conversely, the jury might be unduly influenced by the ratio to
increase its punitive award in cases where, because of mitigating
circumstances, an award below the ratio would be appropriate.
3.

Effect on the administration of justice.

The Crookstons' house collapsed nearly 11 years ago. This
case has been outstanding for more than nine years and has already
included one appeal.

The emotional costs of the prolonged litiga-

tion continue to be problematic for the Crookstons.
A new trial would also be a burden on the administration
of justice. This Court has already upheld the finding of fraud and
determined that punitive damages are in order.

It would be unreal-

istic to believe, however, that a new trial on th€> amount of punitive damages would be simple.

The parties would be retrying the

original case in order to give a new jury the full perspective of
the defendant's actions. Obviously, the cost in time and effort for
the court would burden an already crowded docket.
The trial court reasonably concluded that the cost to the
parties and the burden upon the trial court far outweighed any
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speculative benefit to Fire Insurance.

If appropriate, the trial

court was empowered to reduce the award without a new trial.
However, the judge determined the evidence was sufficient to support
the amount of the original punitive award.
X.

CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S EXPLICIT HOLDING, FIRE
INSURANCE IS INVITING THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE
JURY'S FINDINGS DIRECTLY RATHER THAN REVIEWING
THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON
THE MOTION.
This Court took great pains in Crookston to clarify the

relative roles of the trial and appellate courts.

Rather than

reviewing the jury award directly, this Court's function is to
determine whether the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying
Fire Insurance's motion for new trial and remittitur.
In his memorandum decision, Judge Frederick addressed each
of the seven factors pertinent to the award of punitive damages and
outlined his findings as to each element.

In its brief, Fire

Insurance addresses each of the seven elements but in most instances
assiduously avoids discussing Judge Frederick's findings.

Rather,

Fire Insurance attempts to recharacterize the evidence in a light
most favorable to its position and reaches conclusions directly
opposite to those found by the trial court.
The issue here is not whether there were other inferences
the trial court could have drawn.

Rather, the issue is whether

Judge Frederick, after having viewed the witnesses and evaluated the
evidence, had a reasonable basis for reaching the conclusions he
did.

Fire

Insurance

has

failed

to

demonstrate

Frederick's ruling had no reasonable basis.
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that

Judge

XI.

FIRE INSURANCE HAS NO BASIS TO ASSERT THAT
IT WAS UNDULY PREJUDICED BY THE PRESENTATION
OF ITS WEALTH TO THE JURY.
Fire Insurance speculates that the introduction of evi-

dence as to its wealth may have affected the jury's determination of
liability.

This Court has already affirmed defendant's liability

and it is inappropriate to raise the issue again. In any event, the
evidence was abundant and clear that Fire Insurance committed fraud
and other wrongful acts. Fire Insurance's wealth had nothing to do
with the jury's finding of liability in this case.
The introduction of Fire Insurance's wealth during trial
was in full compliance with the law

at that time.

In fact, this

Court had previously held that a verdict awarding punitive damages
could not stand where the plaintiff had not introduced evidence of
defendant's wealth.

See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1219

(Utah 1983) .
By failing to object, Fire Insurance has waived any claim
that it was prejudiced by this evidence.

R. 002516.

Furthermore,

Fire Insurance never requested a bifurcation of the issues of
liability and punitive damages.
XII. FIRE INSURANCE STILL DOES NOT APPARENTLY COMPREHEND
THE NOXIOUS NATURE OF ITS WRONGDOING.
Fire Insurance asserts that it has been punished enough by
payment of $1.5 million in compensatory damages.

Fire Insurance

ignores the fact that $1 million of this payment was compensatory
damages for injuries caused from 1982 to 1987 and paid in 1991 only
after Fire Insurance was forced to pay as a result of the Crookston
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opinion. The remainder of Fire Insurance's payment was interest—a
payment exacted as a result of Fire Insurance's intransigence.
The logic of Fire Insurance's argument demonstrates its
absurdity. According to Fire Insurance, there should be an inverse
relationship

between

the

amount

of

compensatory

and

punitive

damages. Under its theory, the defendant who acts most maliciously
and inflicts the most severe injuries would have the least fear of
ever paying punitive damages.
XIII.

NOTHING INDICATES THAT JUDGE FREDERICK WAS
UNFAIRLY INFLUENCED BY EVIDENCE NOT IN THE
RECORD.
On pages 24-25 of its brief, Fire Insurance states that

Crookstons represented to the trial court that after trial, plaintiffs remained homeless, were unable to obtain credit, and the
creditors had not been paid.

Crookstons provided this information

to illustrate the continuing effect that Fire Insurance's misconduct
had had on the lives of the Crookstons and others. The only reference to this information by the trial court was that Crookstons'
parents were not paid until after this Court rendered its decision
in June 1991.
The trial court may draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence.

At trial, plaintiffs, Anna Drake (trustee of the plain-

tiffs' bankruptcy

estate)

and

other witnesses

testified

that

plaintiffs' parents were creditors of the estate and that the only
asset

of

Insurance.

the

estate

was

the

plaintiffs' claim

against

Fire

(R. 1842, 1859-64) Since Fire Insurance admittedly did

not pay any of the compensatory damages until after the first
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appeal, it was quite reasonable for Judge Frederick to conclude that
the parents and other creditors were not paid during the interim.
Regardless of the reasonable inference, Judge Frederick
based his decision primarily upon the high degree of malice shown by
Fire Insurance and the probability of the recurrence of the conduct.
This reference to the injuries suffered by the Crookstons' parents
hardly undermines the integrity of the trial court/s decision.
Fire Insurance also asserts that plaintiffs' counsel,
during oral argument, referred to other insurance companies in the
Farmer's Insurance Group that use the same claims personnel as Fire
Insurance.

Counsel for Fire Insurance objected to any evidence

relating to the wealth of these other companies.

The trial court

acknowledged the objection, stating:
Well, it is accurate to state that there is no
evidence before me regarding the wealth of the
other members of the group; however, keeping in
mind this is simply argument, this issue has
been previously broached in the briefs which I
have read, but your objection is well taken,
Mr. Fishier. There is no evidence before me
regarding that.
R. 3273-3274.

Although Fire Insurance characterizes these refer-

ences as an attempt to unduly prejudice and inflame the judge, Judge
Frederick recognized that it was merely argument and that he was
aware that this was not evidence.

Nothing in the judge's decision

refers to the wealth of the other companies
Insurance Group.

in the Farmer's

In any event, it is not an unreasonable inference

that the companies of the Farmers Insurance Group have monetary
^alue, even if the extent of their wealth is unknown.
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Finally, Fire Insurance takes exception to three portions
of the order denying Fire Insurance's motion based on insufficient
evidence.

Fire Insurance first objects to the following language:
The wrongdoing of this case was motivated by
financial gain.
When dealing with a multimillion dollar corporation which appears to
have a prevailing philosophy that justifies
unscrupulous behavior for financial gain, a
significant punitive award is required.

The first sentence in this quote deals with a factual issue.

The

jury, the trial court, as well as this Court have affirmed that Fire
Insurance perpetrated a fraud.

It does not seem to be an unusual

nor unreasonable inference for Judge Frederick to conclude that the
fraud was perpetrated to bolster Fire Insurance's profits. The only
other alternative is that the fraud was perpetrated solely out of
spite or ill will, a conclusion which Fire Insurance has vehemently
denied.
Judge Frederick concluded

that Fire Insurance has a

prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous behavior. This is
a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, including the
testimony of the adjusters that their actions were conducted in
accordance with Fire Insurance's prevailing philosophy and business
practices. Moreover, the adjusters considered these practices to be
sound business and performed in good faith. Judge Frederick was in
the advantaged position of having heard and seen the arrogance and
callousness of the adjusters that the cold record now hides.
Judge Frederick noted that Fire Insurance, in responding
to the insurance commission, denied any wrongdoing and ratified Mr.
Clapperton's conduct.

Thereafter, Fire Insurance twice promoted
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Clapperton, placing him in charge of all claims adjusting in
northern Utah, thus, apparently rewarding his conduct.

Given this

evidence, it was reasonable for Judge Frederick to conclude that a
significant amount of punitive damages was required to change the
company's practices.
Fire Insurance additionally

objects to the following

language in the order:
This court concludes that the most effective
means of punishing and deterring the defendant
in this case is through a significant punitive
damage award. Insurance companies are generally regulated by the Insurance Department of the
State of Utah. This case illustrates the lack
of
deterrent
effect
of
the
insurance
department.
The first sentence is merely the court's conclusions based on all
his findings.

The second sentence is a statement of fact of which

the trial court may take judicial notice.

It would indeed be

puzzling for Fire Insurance to contest this fact. The last sentence
relates to the clear factual record that after the Crookstons lodged
a formal complaint with the insurance department, Fire Insurance
denied

any

liability.

The

insurance department,

lacking the

resources to pursue the matter, recommended that the Crookstons
institute these proceedings. What better example can illustrate the
department's lack of deterrent effect on Fire Insurance.
Finally, Fire Insurance takes exception to the following
language:
Defendant, by the very nature of its business,
has the capacity and expertise to calculate in
advance its exposure to liability and spread
the cost thereof, thus diminishing the deterrent effect of punitive damages if limited by
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ratio or ceiling. In this case the relative
importance of the presumptive ratio should
therefore be less.
While admittedly there probably is no actual evidence as to the
calculation of exposure to liability, Judge Frederick in reaching
his conclusions was certainly not required to surrender his life's
experiences and common knowledge.

It is hardly disputed that the

insurance industry employs actuaries and underwriters to assess risk
and set premiums accordingly.

The very essence of insurance is

spreading a risk of loss through widespread premiums.

Given the

industry's expertise, it is certainly not unreasonable for the court
to reach this conclusion.
XIV.

FIRE INSURANCE'S ARGUMENTS BESPEAK A LACK OF
ETHICAL AND MORAL JUDGMENT APPARENTLY TYPICAL
OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE.
Although Fire Insurance now "acknowledges" that the jury

and this Court found that it perpetrated an intentional fraud, it
nonetheless argues vociferously there was no relationship of trust
or reliance created by the insurance contract because of the
adversary

relationship

between

it and

the

Crookstons.

Fire

Insurance does not appear to grasp the important distinction between
an adversary relationship and intentional fraud.
previously

set the standard

This Court has

for acceptable business ethics as

follows:
It can hardly be maintained that the general
moral level of business and other financial
relationships would be enhanced by a rule of
law which would allow a person to defend
against a willful, deliberate fraud by stating,
"You should not have trusted or believed me" or
"Had you not been so gullible you would not
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have been [so] deceived." The rules governing
fraud should foster intercourse based on trust,
forthrightness, and honesty.
[Citations
omitted.]
Berkley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah
1980).

Fire Insurance's attitude seems to be endemic to the

insurance industry and underscores the need of significant punitive
awards to bring the practices of all insurance companies into line
with acceptable business practices.
Given the significant profits to be gained by unscrupulous
conduct, one commentator has emphasized the need for a significant
deterrent:
Another consideration that has not been
expressly articulated by the courts but which
seems to logically flow from the purposes of
punitive damages is the opportunity that defendant and others may have to repeat the wrongful
conduct and the likelihood that defendant would
repeat that conduct unless adequately deterred
by an award of punitive damages.
It seems
obvious that if the defendant is in a position
to repeat its conduct and has an incentive to
do so because, for example, of the profitability of that conduct, the need for a substantial
punitive damage award to deter such conduct is
greater than if the conduct is not particularly
profitable to the defendant or involved unusual
circumstances that are not likely to arise
again.
This factor may have special relevance to the
area of insurance bad faith. A large insurer
that underwrites thousands of policies with the
potential for a significant number of claims
has both the opportunity and the financial
incentive to engage in unreasonable claims
practices. Unless checked by an adequate award
of punitive damages, the insurer might well
regard its potential compensatory damage exposure as an acceptable "risk" of doing business
and therefore continue to engage in such
conduct.
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Shernoff, Gage & Levine, Insurance Bad Faith Litigation, Matthew
Bender 1991, Section 8.08[5], pp. 8.36-8.37. The quest for money is
the motivation for illegal activity. A monetary penalty is thus the
only means of changing the motivation.
One commentator has observed a very interesting phenomenon
regarding reform in the insurance industry.

Professor Harvey

Levine, reviewing numerous articles and speeches advocating reform
in claims practices, observed:
Those authors and speakers do not condemn the
practices of the past, nor do they consider the
need for formulating a foundation of social
conscience in the future. Instead, each of the
authors and speakers, without exception, has
merely focused upon the need to improve claims
practices so as to avoid punitive damages
verdicts. The suggested reforms do not grow
out of condemnations of unscrupulous treatment
of insureds; thev are mere defensive efforts to
avoid punitive damages verdicts. Absent the
development of the tort theory of recovery and
the incidental punitive damages verdicts, it is
doubtful that the claims practices of the
insureds would be any less unconscionable than
they were prior to the imposition of substantial exemplary damages liability.
[Emphasis
added.]
Levine,

"Demonstrating

and Preserving the Deterrent

Effect of

Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions," University of San
Francisco Law Review, Vol. 13, p. 626.
Fire

Insurance

has

never

admitted

or

acknowledged

culpability nor has it ever expressed remorse for its reprehensible
conduct.

Discussions about moral imperatives and ethical conduct

will not change Fire Insurance's attitude.

The only language that

Fire Insurance understands is the language of money.

By its

punitive award, the jury sent a message to Fire Insurance in the
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language that it understands best.

Hopefully, Fire Insurance and

similarly situated companies will ultimately hear the message and
act to curb their unlawful practices.

By contrast, a reduction in

the award sends a much weaker and perhaps a contradictory message.
An unscrupulous insurance company should never be lead to believe
that, given the appropriate opportunities, it may profit from
wrongdoing in the State of Utah.
CONCLUSION
This Court does not sit to retry the facts or second guess
the jury. Rather, its duty is to review Judge Frederick's ruling on
Fire Insurance's motion to determine if Judge Frederick abused his
discretion

in refusing to disturb the jury's verdict.

Judge

Frederick was present at the trial and is best positioned to determine whether the jury award was a product of passion and prejudice.
Judge Frederick, after hearing the evidence first hand and evaluating the parties' extensive arguments concerning

the evidence,

balanced the relevant factors and determined that the punitive award
was appropriate.

His conclusions were reasonable and abundantly

supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Crookstons respectfully
request this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of Fire
Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and award them their
costs on appeal.
DATED this

/ / ^ day of September, 1992.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN £x^WELL/>£. C.

M. Douglas Ba
Attorneys for Plaintiff&^Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ,
This is to certify that on the

/7

day of September,

1992, four true and correct copies of RESPONDENTS' BRIEF were hand
delivered to:
Philip R. Fishier
Stephen J. Trayner
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant Fire
Insurance Exchange
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and four true and correct copies were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Frank A. Roybal
Attorney for Defendant Fire
Insurance Exchange
442 No. Main Street
Bountiful, UT 84010
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

S. LARRY CROOKSTON, et al.,

CASE NO. CR-83-1030

Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant.

Defendant

Fire

Insurance

Exchange

(hereinafter

"Fire

Insurance") has filed a Motion for New Trial or Remittitur,
with supporting Memoranda; plaintiffs have responded by filing
a Memorandum in opposition.

These pleadings were filed after

failed efforts to settle the controversy

conducted by this

Court on October 7, 1991.
This matter was tried with a jury for six days, commencing
on the 26th day of May, 1987.

After denial of defendant Fire

Insurance's initial Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, the
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Crookston v. Fire Insurance
Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (June 28, 1991), affirmed the
jury verdict, but remanded the matter for further determination
by this Court as to whether or not the punitive damage award
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Memoranda,
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After

presented

submission

of

argument

in

oral

support of their respective positions on January

31, 1992.

This Court having now reviewed the Memoranda, the Supreme Court
decision, the file materials, the transcript, its own notes of
the trial, and heard oral argument, is prepared to rule.

OPINION
At trial, plaintiffs7 expert economist, Dr. Paul Randall,
testified incident to the claim of economic damages sustained
by the plaintiffs as a result of conduct alleged to have been
inappropriate by the defendant Fire Insurance.

He testified

that those economic losses amounted to $323,399.00.

The jury

awarded the sum of $815,826.00 total compensatory damages.

The

Supreme

the

Court

has

opined

that

the

difference

between

economic losses and the total amount of compensatory damages
awarded, namely, $492,427.00 was "apparently attributable to
emotional

distress

and

loss

of

financial

reputation."

In

addition, the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of
$4,000,000.00.

This

Court,

subsequent

to

trial

awarded

$175,000.00 attorney's fees to plaintiffs, as well as their
costs incurred of $11,126.00.

Fire Insurance seeks, pursuant
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59(a)(5), a remittitur of the punitive damages of

$4,000,000.00, or alternatively a new trial.
A Motion for a New Trial as presented, on the issue of
punitive

damages

requires

of

the

trial

court

a

two-prong

inquiry:

(1) whether punitives are appropriate at all; and (2)

whether the amount of punitives is excessive, appearing to have
been

given

under

influence

of

passion

or

prejudice.

The

responsibility of the trial court is to review the amount of
the award to insure that the jury has acted within proper
bounds.

This is so because the trial judge is present during

all aspects of the trial and listens to and views all witnesses
and is in an advantaged position to determine if the jury acted
with passion or prejudice.

To grant a new trial, the trial

court must conclude that the jury erred, not merely because it
disagrees with the jury's judgment.

The trial court, if it is

inclined to grant a new trial or remittitur, should indicate
wherein there was plain disregard of the instructions of the
Court or the evidence, or what constituted passion or prejudice.
If the trial court reasonably concludes the jury acted with
passion or prejudice contrary to Rule 59(a)(5) it may grant a
new trial.

0.-3.1 S 9

CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE

The

award

of

PAGE 4

compensatory

MEMORANDUM DECISION

damages

in

the

amount

of

$323,339.00 for economic loss, and $492,427.00 for emotional
and mental distress, and loss of financial reputation, for a
total of $815,826.00, was upheld by the Supreme Court, as was
the award of attorney's fees of $175,000.00, and expenses of
$11,126.00.

These sums this Court is advised were paid after

the decision by the Utah Supreme Court.
In this case, the jury clearly concluded as did this Court,
that the requisite mental state required to support an award of
punitive damages was present, which finding was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Punitive damages are designed
future, egregious conduct.
according
general

to

the

pattern

Supreme

set by

to punish past and deter

Here, the award of $4,000,000.00
Court

prior

exceeds

Supreme

the

Court

bounds

of

the

decisions.

In

deciding, therefore, whether the award is or is not excessive,
notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds the pattern of awards
previously upheld, seven factors are to be considered.
are

the

same

seven

factors

considered

by

the

Instruction No. 33) in arriving at its verdict.

These

jury

(in

This Court

will address each, in a somewhat different order, commencing
with the facts and circumstances surrounding Fire Insurance's
misconduct.
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FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING FIRE
INSURANCES MISCONDUCT

The most flagrant conduct of Fire Insurance centered around
intentional

fraud of

its agents.

By April

15, 1982, Fire

Insurance, for the loss plaintiffs# sustained in December of
1981,

had

$50,951.00;

obtained
the

bids

other

from

for

two

contractors:

$49,600.00;

and

had

authority to settle the claim for $49,443.00.

Fire

Denton Mosier,

Insurance

replaced

its

for

extended

In May, 1982,

the adjuster obtained another bid for $74,000.00.
thereafter,

one

initial

Immediately
adjuster,

with one "more experienced," Alan Clapperton.

Alan Clapperton, while in possession of the three bids ranging
from $49,600.00 to $74,000.00, and armed with authority to
settle

for

fictitious

$49,443.00, nevertheless, sought
bid

based

only

on

a portion

and

of

the

obtained
loss,

a

for

$27,830.60, which was just slightly more than one-half of the
other bids received.

The evidence was undisputed that the bid

did not account for several items comprising the plaintiffs'
loss, and was based upon an engineering report which was not
intended to be the basis of a bid.

Clapperton knew the bid was

insufficient; he knew the Crookstons would object to the bid;
and moreover, he knew that the bank (loss payee) with whom he
had arranged to meet to negotiate settlement, would not settle
for such amount if the other bids were disclosed.
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In order to accomplish his scheme, Clapperton simply told
Ralph Klemm, counsel for the plaintiffs, on the very day he was
scheduled to meet with the bank, that he had no authority to
settle; concealed
without

the existence of the

disclosing

his

intent

to

fictitious bid; and

Klemm,

conducted his negotiations with the bank.

surreptitiously

While meeting with

the bank, Clapperton did not disclose the fact that three other
bids, all substantially higher, had been obtained, nor did he
reveal that the fictitious bid of $27,830.60 was based on an
engineer's appraisal limited to structural damage only.
bank

officer

agreed

to

settle

for

slightly

more

The
than

$32,000.00, the amount of the "bid", plus an approximation of
the interest that had accrued on the Crookston loan since the
collapse.

Knowing

substantially

full

well

that

the

$27,830.60

lower than any other bid, Clapperton

bid

was

insisted

that the bank accept a settlement check made out only to the
bank, not jointly to the bank and the Crookstons, and that the
bank execute a proof of loss form releasing Fire Insurance from
any

further

liability

effected that same day.
when Clapperton

on

the

claim.

The

settlement

was

The intentional fraud was completed

advised Klemm, when he discovered what had

transpired, that the Crookstons did not have to be included in
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the settlement, that nothing more was owing, and that he was
closing his file.
Clapperton admitted at trial that he knew that the bank
would pursue the Crookstons
$60,000.00

construction

settlement.

Clapperton

for a deficiency

loan

not

purposely

claim on the

paid

by

the

insurance

sought

an

incomplete

and

unrealistic bid from an insider, Phipps; concealed the bid from
the Crookstons, lied to their attorney about the status of the
claim on the very day he negotiated with the bank; did not
disclose that he had any settlement authority; and deliberately
excluded

the

Crookstons

from

negotiations

with

the

bank.

Because the Crookstons lacked the means to pay off the loan,
the bank threatened foreclosure.

In order to avoid additional

interest, attorney's fees and costs, the Crookstons deeded the
property

on which the home stood, to the bank in lieu of

foreclosure, and then filed bankruptcy.
Clapperton left the Crookstons vulnerable to foreclosure
and bankruptcy knowing that would be the likely consequence of
his actions.
Clapperton's

supervisor,

Kent

Soderquist,

had

previous

experience as a loan officer for a bank and was aware of the
bank's

foreclosure

rights

under

its

Deed

of

Trust.

Both
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Soderquist and Clapperton were well aware that if insurance
proceeds were not timely and adequately paid, the bank would
foreclose.

Furthermore, Fire Insurance through its agents had

actual knowledge that the bank was proceeding or intended to
proceed to foreclose on Crookstons' property.
evidence

of

Fire

Insurance's

intent

The most graphic
evidencing

total

indifference to the Crookstons' plight, can be seen from the
language of the letter, a trial exhibit, from Clapperton to
Frank Roybal, counsel for Fire Insurance, dated July 27, 1982,
at page 3, wherein Clapperton states as follows:
The bank has indicated that they intended to
proceed with foreclosure on the lot in order
to recoup the $18,000.00 they were still out
on the construction loan.... At this point,
we feel Farmers Insurance Group would have ci
subrogation right against several of the
parties involved.
All

of

Fire

Insurance's

representatives

acknowledged

at

trial that the purpose of insurance was to prevent extreme
financial hardship and loss of property that would otherwise
occur, but for insurance.

Fire Insurance ratified and approved

all of the actions taken by its agents.

The regional office of

Fire Insurance and the district branch claims manager reviewed
the claims file routinely during all relevant times, and had
made various communications to the adjusters.
After the Crookstons filed a complaint with the Utah State
Insurance

Department,

the

regional

office

denied

any
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Incredibly the agents of

Fire Insurance testified at trial that the practices which had
been

employed

in this

case were

sound

business practices.

Three of Fire Insurance's employees who testified
stated

that

fairly.

they

The

believed

claims

they

adjuster

had
who

treated

the

committed

at trial
Crookstons

the

fraud,

Clapperton, stated without any indication of remorse or regret,
that he

"felt good" about what he did

to the Crookstons.

Apparently, based upon his record of improving profits for Fire
Insurance, he was twice promoted since his dealings with the
Crookstons.

He is now the District Claims Manager supervising

the adjustment of all claims in northern Utah.

II.

THE RELATIVE WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT

At trial, evidence established that Fire insurance's total
assets in 1986, the year immediately prior to the date of the
trial, were $723,468,116.00; its total underwriting, investment
and other income for 1986 was $595,284,582.00; and its net
income for that one year was $23,000,000.00.

At the time of

the trial, the evidence disclosed that there were four claims
offices in Utah, each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year.
In addition, scores of other offices located in the western
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number

of

claims.

Fire

Insurance is only one of approximately five insurance companies
doing business as Farmers Insurance Group.

Four of the five

Farmers companies use the same claims offices, management, and
presumably the same claims adjustment techniques as that of
Fire insurance.

When compared to the total assets of Fire

Insurance only, for 1986, the punitive damage award amounts to
approximately one-half of one percent.

It goes without saying

that there is no rational comparison between Fire Insurance's
assets and income to that of plaintiffs: they were bankrupt.

III.
Milton

Beck,

NATURE OF THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT
an

insurance

adjuster

with

22

years

of

experience, and Dr. Paul Randall, a professor of finance, who
teaches

property

University,

and

casualty

persuasively

insurance

described

the

at

Utah

actions

of

State
Fire

Insurance as "blatantly outrageous" and "totally unacceptable",
outlining the following wrongful actions:
(a)

Excluding the Crookstons from settlement negotiations;

(b)

Relying on a bid which was almost one-half of other

bids.

Such a discrepancy would mean there was something

wrong with the low bid;

GP2G5
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(c)

Failing to disclose all other bids to the bank;

(d)

Improperly requiring the bank to sign a satisfaction

of claim and release without rebuilding the home;
(e) Requiring the bank to sign a release and refusing to
deal with the Crookstons thereafter, leaving the Crookstons
personally exposed to further proceedings by the bank;
(f)

Representing

that

the

Phipps

bid

($27,830.60)

was

adequate, and all that was owing under the policy, when
there

were

clearly

other

coverages

and

amounts

owing

thereunder;
(g)

Refusing to include the insureds7 name on a settlement

check in payment of a substantial amount of money;
(h)

Representing that engineer Rich's report (on which the

Phipps "bid" was obtained) was a complete analysis of the
damage when it was not;
(i) Using the Crookstons7 failure to sign a proof of loss
form as grounds for denying their claims, particularly when
the Crookstons were not provided with such a form, and
adequate evidence of the loss had been provided to Fire
Insurance;
(j)

Rejecting the bids of Brewster, Stallings and Jones

(the three legitimate bids) because of insufficient detail,
without requesting the additional information and detail;
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Crookstons

that

Fire

Insurance was rejecting the other bids and the reasons
therefore;
(1) Not

communicating

with

the

Crookstons

during

the

entire adjusting process;
(m)

Refusing

Crookstons

to
after

responsibility

to

consider

additional

settling
the

with

insurance

claims

the

of

bank,

denying

commissioner

complaint was filed by the Crookstons, and

the

when

a

forcing the

Crookstons to bring legal action;
(n) Refusing to clean up the collapse, even after the city
had given notice and threatened to condemn the property due
to the hazardous situation;
(o)

Delaying over six months while the Crookston home was

unfit for occupation, before making any attempts to settle;
(p) Maintaining a company policy that the only duty of an
adjuster

is to

protect

the

financial

interests

of

the

insurance company and not the insured.

The

evidence

supporting

Fire

Insurance's

position

with

regard to the adjustment of the Crookstons' claim and Fire
Insurance's apparent satisfaction with the manner in which its

C-52C7
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own insureds were treated represents both to this Court and
apparently to the jury, that ill-will, malice and/or total
indifference to the Crookstons was its attitude.

Having sought

an inadequate bid, and having excluded the Crookstons from the
negotiations,

Fire

Insurance

settlement with the bank.
have

a

devastating

impact

was

in

total

control

of

the

Knowing that the settlement would
on

the

Crookstons,

Clapperton

nevertheless proceeded in a fraudulent, malicious fashion with
one goal in mind:
due

and

employer.

thereby

to cheat the plaintiffs out of their just
presumably

improve

his

standing

with

his

By their actions, the agents and representatives of

Fire Insurance demonstrated either actual malice and ill-will
toward the Crookstons and intended the consequence of their
actions, or Fire Insurance's agents acted wrongfully, solely to
further

their

own

financial

well-being,

despite

actual

knowledge of devastating harm to the Crookstons.

IV.

THE EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S MISCONDUCT ON THE LIVES
OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND OTHERS

The plaintiffs each testified at trial to the devastating
effect the actions of Fire Insurance had on their personal

G^ros
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They suffered serious emotional and nervous conditions,
were

of

long-standing

nature,

and

the

testified to continued from the date of the

devastation

Loss, at least

through the trial (approximately six years).

In addition, the

plaintiffs were

and

forced

to

file bankruptcy

lost, as a

result, all of their savings and the lot they had purchased
upon which to build their "dream home."
The loss to others involved the parents of the plaintiffs
who had loaned them some $12,000.00 for the construction of
their home.

They were not paid until after the Supreme Court

decision in this matter, in June 1991, some ten years after the
loss.

In addition, none of the Crookston bankruptcy creditors

were paid.
being

The bank, after settling with Fire Insurance and

required

property,
$5,000.00.

to

foreclose

nevertheless

and

sustained

repossess
a

loss

the
of

Crookstons/
approximately

Subcontractors who provided materials and labor to

the Crookstons' home were forced to file liens and commence a
suit against the Crookstons.

The general contractor was never

fully paid, and Fire Insurance failed to timely clean up the
debris from the collapse of the home, forcing the city where
the home was located to seek condemnation of the Crookstons'
property because of the hazardous condition

it created

neighborhood children.

0^209
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THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE RECURRENCE OF THE MISCONDUCT

Fire

Insurance

wrongdoing

has

maintained

since the beginning

a

of

stance

this

of

case.

denial
All

of

of the

witnesses for Fire Insurance testified they believed they had
treated the Crookstons fairly.
that

he

felt

Clapperton

good

has

been

about

Clapperton, moreover, testified

what

twice

he

did

promoted

to

since

the
the

Crookstons.
incident

in

question, and as indicated he is now District Claims Manager
for Northern Utah.
Denton Mosier, since his involvement in the matter, has
been made supervisor and testified that the handling of the
Crookstons7

claim was done according to company policy, was

appropriate,

and

was handled

in

a

fashion

similar

to the

handling of other claims.
Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton's supervisor at the time of the
loss, described the claims adjusting philosophy of not just
Fire Insurance, but for all Farmers Insurance Group to indicate
that the adjuster's sole responsibility

is his duty to the

insurance

insurance

interests.

company:

to

protect

the

company's

And any efforts to assist the insureds in proving

their loss would be "beyond the scope of his actual duties as
an adjuster."

He testified the adjuster does not have a duty
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to protect the interests of the insureds, and technically the
adjuster

is

not

required

to

be

concerned

about

public

relations.
In

addition,

the

evidence

revealed

that

there

are

approximately four claims offices of Fire Insurance in Utah,
each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year, and scores of
other such claims offices throughout the states which handle a
similar number of claims.

These claims offices adjust most, if

not all, claims of all members of the Farmers Insurance Group.
It is the view of this Court, that Fire Insurance's conduct
and lack of remorse incident thereto demonstrate a calculated
and calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and
this is in accord with what agents of Fire Insurance perceive
to be in keeping with their company policy.
From Fire Insurance's point of view, it certainly can be
argued

that

$4,000,000.00

punitive

damages

is

excessive.

However, from a public policy point of view, the award is
justified.

In the absence of punitive damages, Fire Insurance

may well find that it is profitable to continue its illegal
conduct, even though it may incur the cost of compensatory
damages from time to time.
thousands

One may never know how many of the

of claims handled

in Utah

and

elsewhere by Fire

H *> r>'\ -f
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Insurance have been subjected to the same kind of fraudulent
manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses
to

those

who

contracted

in

good

faith.

A

$4,000,000.00

punitive damage award can certainly have a salubrious effect in
inducing Fire Insurance to bring its practices into harmony
with common moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say
nothing of the requirements of the law.

VI.
The

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES

loss payee provision

in favor of the bank

insurance policy with Fire Insurance created

on the

a relationship

between the Crookstons and Fire Insurance of one in the nature
of

a

fiduciary

relationship.

In

a

third

party

insurance

situation, the insurer is a fiduciary of the insured.

The

insurer assumes responsibility for the insured and control over
the claims of third parties against the insured.

By contrast,

in first party situations, the insurer and the insured are
essentially

adversaries,

because

their

interests

concerning

payment under the policy are opposed.
The instant matter is somewhere between a first and third
party situation.

The insurer by its loss payee responsibility

assumed the position of standing in for and protecting the

CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE
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interests of the Crookstons from claims of the bank, the loss
payee.
the

If Fire Insurance did not have a legal duty to protect

interests

responsibility

of
to

the

Crookstons,

avoid

doing

harm

it

at

to

least

the

had

Crookstons

the
by

surreptitiously settling with the bank for sums admittedly much
less than the balance owing on the bank obligation; the policy
limits; and well below the amount of the legitimate bids known
to the defendant.

VII.

THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES AWARDED

The actual attorney's

fees paid by the Crookstons were

based upon a contingency fee of 40%. This Court, however, only
awarded $175,000.00 in fees, which was a little more than half
of the actual
litigation
Crookstons.
the words

fees paid by the Crookstons.

expenses

constituted

an

The

actual

fees and

loss

to

the

In determining the ratio, the Supreme Court used
"actual damages."

Since the attorney's

fees and

litigation expenses were an "actual" damage sustained by the
Crookstons and were awarded by the Court, such figures should
be included in determining the ratio.
Canyon Country

This is consistent with

Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d

414

(Utah

1989),

wherein the Supreme Court held that the actual contingent fee

«:?213
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was a consequential damage and should be awarded against the
insurer who acted in bad faith, stating at 420:
Canyon Country's claim for recovery of fees
was predicated on the theory that attorney
fees were an item of consequential damages
flowing
from
the
insurers' breach
of
contract. This is a legitimate theory of
damages, as the trial court recognized.
Had Canyon Country been decided before the Crookston trial,
this Court would have awarded a 40% contingent fee instead of
$175,000.00 in "reasonable" fees actually awarded.
of

$151,330.00

as

unawarded

fees,

The deficit

constitutes

additional

"actual" loss to the Crookstons.
The

amount

$1,153,282.00
$151,330.00
costs).

of

actual

damages

($815,826.00
attorney's

incurred

compensatory,

fees,

and

amounts

$175,000.00

$11,126.00

expenses

to
and
and

When compared to the punitive damage sum awarded of

$4,000,000.00, the ratio is

^proximately 2.88 to 1.

There is

nothing in the Crookston opinion that would suggest that the
presumptive ratio is based on "hard" damages, rather than all
"actual" damages.

In fact, in the cases cited in Crookston

where "soft" damages were awarded, the ratio cited by the court
includes the "soft" damages.

The Supreme Court suggests that

if a substantial portion of the damages are "soft", the trial

O321A
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a motion

for remittitur.

However, it is not a factor to determine the ratio.

The Utah

Supreme Court has never suggested that "soft" damages are not
real or should not be compensated.
Though the amount of so-called
approximately

60% of the total

"soft" damages comprises

compensatory

damage

award,

those damages were nevertheless real, and represented suffering
and loss sustained by plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs' emotional

distress was severe and of longstanding duration.

The jury was

instructed as to what properly constitutes emotional distress,
pain

and

suffering.

determination
discretion.

by

the

The

Supreme

jury

as

Court
being

has
well

affirmed

that

within

their

This Court's view is that the jury's finding was

appropriate and supported by the evidence.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in the case of Price v.
Peterson. 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), at 1329:
The pain and suffering inflicted on the mind
and the emotions by such wrongful act of
another is no less real; and should be no
less entitled to be compensated for.
The

problem

is

not

that

emotional

harm

should

not

be

compensated, but how to insure that the damages awarded are
commensurate

with

the

emotional

harm.

In

addressing

the
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problem, courts often consider whether there is physical harm
associated

with

the mental

harm.

Courts

also

examine

the

conduct of the defendant to determine whether emotional harm
will

naturally

and

reasonably

follow

therefrom.

Professor

Prosser, in discussing this issue, stated:
[W]here physical harm is lacking, the courts
will properly tend to look for more in the
way of extreme outrage as an assurance that
the mental disturbance claimed
is not
fictitious; but that if the enormity of the
outrage itself carries conviction that there
has
in fact been severe and
serious
emotional distress which is neither feigned,
nor trivial, bodily harm is not required.
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal.Rev. 40
(1956).
The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and outrageous.
There is nothing fictitious or trivial about the Crookstons'
bankruptcy

and loss of their home and property.

Given the

egregious conduct and succeeding events, there is no doubt that
the Crookstons' claims for mental distress are real, unfeigned,
and far from trivial and therefore should be viewed as real
damage.
T;:e amount
reasonable

of

punitive

relationship

to

damages
the

awarded

actual

must

bear

compensatory

some

damages

incurred as the jury was instructed in Instruction No. 34.
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Despite the fact that the ratio here involved is higher than
has been generally approved by the Supreme Court in the past,
here

the

defendant

is

a

multi-million

dollar

Moreover, it is this Court's view that
displayed

an

extremely

high

degree

Fire

corporation.
Insurance has

of malice, with

actual

intent to harm for the benefit of its own financial interests,
or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great harm
to the plaintiffs based upon the reprehensible nature of the
acts involved.
The

calculation

of

the

ratio

is

simply

one

of

seven

separate elements and to be given, in this Court's view, no
greater or lesser weight than any of the other six elements.
One must not simply, mechanically apply an arbitrary ratio,
thereby allowing the ratio factor to subsume all of the other
six factors to be considered.

It is necessary and appropriate

to send a clear and unmistakable message to Fire Insurance and
others similarly situated that the type of egregious conduct
involved which results in the devastating loss, both financial
and emotional as here involved, will not be tolerated.
the jury has done.

This,

There was no evidence at all at trial that

the practices and procedures involved have in any manner been
changed

by

Fire

Insurance.

There

was

no

indication

C.-3217
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it appeared

that Fire

Insurance was pleased with the outcome of the adjustment of the
loss, and to this day has failed or refused to recognize the
wrong that it has wrought upon the plaintiffs.

If the facts

of this case do not warrant deviation from the historically
approved

ratio of punitives to compensatory

damages, it is

difficult if not impossible for this Court to conceive of a
fact situation wherein a deviation is warranted.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those delineated in
the Memorandum of the plaintiffs in opposition to defendant's
Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, this Court is not persuaded
the jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, and
the Motion of Fire Insurance is denied.

Counsel for plaintiffs

is directed to prepare the appropriate Order.
Dated this

ay of February, 1992.

JNNI^TFRE'DERI CK
JUDGE

["RIOJCJCOURT
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the
this

foregoing Memorandum

Decision,

to the

following,

\D^dav of February, 1992:

L. Rich Humpherys
M, Douglas Bayly
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Philip R. Fishier
Attorney for Defendant Fire Insurance
Sixth Floor, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Frank A. Roybal
Attorney for Defendant Fire Insurance
442 N. Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P. C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION ]
NEW TRIAL OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE REMITTO

v.

]
;1
)>
]>
]I
>
])
]

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,

]>
]l

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Plaintiffs,

Defendant.

]

Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for New "Prial or in the Alternative
Remittitur came regularly before the court on the 31st day of January, 1992, at the hour of 8:30
a.m. The parties previously filed memoranda in support and in opposition to the motion. This
court reviewed the memoranda, the Supreme Court opinion, the file materials, the transcript,
its own notes of the trial and considered extensive oral argument by counsel.

Th© court

thereafter took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on February
10, 1992, wherein the court articulated its findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its

1

decision to deny defendant's motion. Said Memorandum Decision is fully incorporated herein
by reference.
This court reaffirms its denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial and Remittitur and
reaffirms its conclusion that the punitive damage award should not be reduced. In so doing, the
court expresses the following conclusions in conjunction with its more detailed analysis of its
findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum Decision.
1. The primary purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter serious wrongdoing
which is destructive to the social fiber of our society. The severity of the punishment should
coincide with the severity of the wrongdoing. Likewise, the greater the potential is that the
wrongdoing is widespread and profitable, the greater the need is for deterrence.
2. Regarding the purpose of punishment, the court has carefully analyzed the nature and
extent of defendant's wrongdoing and the effect thereof.

It is this court's view that Fire

Insurance has displayed an extremely high degree of malice, with actual intent to harm for the
benefit of its own financial interests, or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great
harm to the plaintiffs. Defendant's actions were reprehensible and involved intentional fraud
for financial gain. Defendant's wrongdoing had devastating effects upon the Crookstons and to
a lesser degree, many other innocent parties.

Defendant's wrongdoing was particularly

aggravating and reprehensible due to the nature of its business, i.e. marketing, advertising and
selling "peace of mind" and "hope" to those who had been devastated by catastrophic events.
When an insurer is called upon to perform, its insureds are often victims of tragic events,
leaving them financially and emotionally vulnerable. The potential adverse effect on the lives

2

0^239

of family members, neighbors, employers and others is also great. Under these circumstances,
intentional fraud for profit is even more culpable. The severity of defendant's actions in this
case requires a severe punishment and the punitive damage award of $4,000,000 is not overly
severe.
3. The second purpose of punitive damages, deterrence, is equally applicable in this
case. Defendant's conduct and lack of remorse incident thereto, not just at the time of the
wrongful conduct but even thereafter throughout the litigation, demonstrate a calculated and
calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and this was in accord with what agents of
defendant perceived to be in keeping with their company policy. The wrongdoing in this case
was motivated by financial gain. When dealing with a multi-million dollar corporation which
appears to have a prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous behavior for financial gain,
a significant punitive damage award is required to obtain the desired result of bringing
defendant's practices into harmony with common moral conduct, accepted business ethics and
the requirements of the law.
4. This court concludes that the most effective means of punishing and deterring the
defendant in this case is through a significant punitive damage award. Insurance companies are
generally regulated by the Insurance Department of the State of Utah. This case illustrates the
lack of deterrent effect of the Insurance Department. After Crookstons filed a complaint with
the Insurance Department, defendant's regional office denied any responsibility to the
Crookstons. The Insurance Department then advised the Crookstons that it could do* nothing
further and that Crookstons would need to seek a judicial remedy. As in this case, there is

3
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nearly always a large disparity between the financial resources of an insurer and its insured,
particularly after a catastrophic loss. The deterrent value of punitive damages is one of the very
few equalizing tools an injured party has against a multimillion dollar corporation which engages
in such wrongful practices.
5. The ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages in this case exceeds the
presumptive ratio set by the Utah Supreme Court in the Crookston opinion. (On page 19 of the
Memorandum Decision this court erred in computing the ratio in this case. The ratio should be
3.47 to 1 instead of 2.88 to 1 and the Memorandum Decision is therefore amended accordingly.)
For the reasons set forth above, a ratio greater than the presumptive ratio is justified.
Defendant, by the very nature of its business, has the capacity and expertise to calculate in
advance its exposure to liability and spread the cost thereof, thus diminishing the deterrent effect
of punitive damages if limited by a ratio or ceiling. In this case the relative importance of the
presumptive ratio should therefore be less.
6. The collective analysis of the seven factors upon which a punitive damage award is
based weighs heavily in favor of sustaining the $4,000,000 award. In fact, with the exception
of the presumptive ratio, all of the seven faciors support the award. If the facts of this case do
not warrant deviation from the historically approved ratio of punitive to compensatory damages,
it is difficult if not impossible for this court to conceive of a fact situation wherein a deviation
is warranted.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Remittitur is denied.
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DATED this ^ a a V o f March, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to Form:
STRONG & HANNI

By:
Philip R. Fishier
Stephen J. Trayner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE REMITTITUR was hand delivered this (o^day of
March, 1992 to:
Philip R. Fishier
Stephen J. Trayner
Strong & Hanni
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT FIRE
INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and mailed first class mail thisl^^day of March, 1992 to:
Frank A. Roybal
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT FIRE
INSURANCE EXCHANGE
442 No. Main Street
Bountiful, UT 84010
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition
to compensatory damages you may in your discretion, when I use the
word discretion, I say you don't have to even find fraud, you wouldn't
have to, but you may, the law says you may award an amount of money
known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is
not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury.
defendant.

It is to punish the

Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary

damages, which means to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel,
but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the
plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are talking about, has had a fraud
perpetrated upon them and as a direct result they were injured and in
addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion award
punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages
is to allow money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose
of protecting the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others
from doing such wrong in the future.

Imposition of punitive damages

is entirely discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to
award it unless this jury feels that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you
must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong
as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
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In addition to the compensatory damages, the Crookstons
also seek an award of punitive damages

against Fire

Insurance

Exchange.
Before punitive

damages may be

Insurance Exchange, you must
plaintiffs

and against

awarded

against

Fire

find the issues in favor of the

the insurance

company

and further, you

must find from a preponderance of the evidence that the insurance
company's employees' conduct was willful and malicious, or such
conduct was done with a knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of, the Crookstons1

rights.

If you so find, you

may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as in your
judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment to Fire
Insurance Exchange for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to
others not to offend in like manner.

If such punitive damages

are given, you should award them with caution and you should keep
in mind they are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the
measure of compensatory damages.
In

determining

the

amount

of

punitive

damages,

you

should consider each of the following factors:
1.

the relative wealth of the defendant;

2.

the nature of the defendant's misconduct;

3.

the

facts

defendant's misconduct;

and

circumstances

surrounding

the

4.

the effect of defendant's misconduct on the lives

of the plaintiffs and others;
5.

the

probability

of

future recurrence of the mis-

6.

the relationship between the parties; and

7.

the amount of compensatory damages awarded.

conduct ;

Punitive damages should be more than an inconvenience to the
defendant and their amount should be sufficient to discourage the
defendant and other companies similarly situated from doing or
repeating such misconduct in the future.

Exhibit E

INSTRUCTION NO.

You

are

instructed

that punitive

damages

constitute an

extraordinary remedy outside the field of usual redress remedies
which should be applied with caution lest, engendered by passion
or

prejudice

because

of

a

wrongdoing,

the

award

becomes

unrealistic or unreasonable.
The law provides no fixed standard as to the amount of
punitive damagesf

but leaves the amount to the jury's sound

discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice, however, the
law

requires

that

any

award

for

such

damages

reasonable relationship to the actual damages.

must

bear a

